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The Constitutional Dilemma of Litigation
Under the Independent Counsel System
William K. Kelleyt
In this Article, I examine the most prominent institutional
outgrowth of the Watergate era and the decision in United
States v. Nixon:' the independent counsel system as
established by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.2 That
system, which created the institution of the independent
counsel, has produced a number of spectacles in American law.
The principal example is the prominent role that Independent
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. I have served
as a consultant to Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, including in some
of the litigation discussed herein; the views reflected in this Article are, of
course, only my own, and should not be taken as reflecting the views of the
Office of Independent Counsel or any of its staff. I thank Rebecca Brown,
John Manning, and Julie O'Sullivan for their gracious comments and collegial
good cheer. I also thank John Nagle for very helpful comments on a prior
draft, and Carrie Beers and Christopher Regan for excellent research
assistance.
1. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
2. Following Watergate, Congress passed the Ethics in Government Act
of 1978, which included among its reforms the creation of a statutory special
prosecutor. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI,
92 Stat. 1824, 1867 (1978). The statute included a sunset provision, and it
was reauthorized upon its expiration in 1983. See Ethics in Government Act
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). Congress
again reauthorized the statute in 1987. See Independent Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (1987).
President Reagan signed the 1987 reauthorization into law, but issued a
signing statement taking the position that the statute was unconstitutional
(while his Justice Department was simultaneously taking the same position in
court). See President's Statement on Signing H.R. 2939 into Law, 23 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1526 (Dec. 15, 1987). The statute lapsed again in 1992, and
lay dormant until it was reauthorized in 1994. See Independent Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732 (1994). The
current version of the independent counsel statute, which I will sometimes
refer to as the "Act," is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
Its terms are substantially similar to the prior versions of the statute. For a
thorough recent accounting of the history of the Act, see Ken Gormley, An
Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. REV. 601
(1999).
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Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, an inferior officer within the
executive branch, played in triggering the proceedings that led
to the impeachment and trial of the President of the United
States.3 But there are any number of other examples as well-
from the President of the United States going on television and
asserting both that Starr is out to get him and that he is
powerless to do anything about it, 4 to another independent
counsel also going on television and claiming that the Attorney
General has obstructed an investigation into serious federal
crimes,5 to yet another independent counsel conducting a
lengthy investigation which yielded no sustainable felony
convictions and thereafter writing a book accusing the
President of the United States, the Vice President of the
United States, and a host of cabinet officers of engaging in a
massive (yet unproved) criminal conspiracy to obstruct justice.6
In recent times, the weaknesses in the system Congress
has constructed have been much noted, both in the popular
media and the legal academic literature 7 My purpose in this
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 595(c).
4. See The News Hour with Jim Lehrer: Newsmaker; President Clinton;
Negative Politics and Whitewater (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 23, 1996)
(responding when asked whether Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr was
"out to get him," "Isn't it obvious?"); President Clinton, Press Conference (Apr.
30, 1998) (responding when asked why he has not sought the dismissal of
Starr that it would not be "appropriate" to do so).
5. See Interview with Independent Counsel Donald Smaltz, Frontline
(May 1998) (claiming that Attorney General Reno refused to allow him to
investigate alleged bribes paid to President Clinton when he was Governor of
Arkansas). Independent Counsel Smaltz twice sought, over the opposition of
the Department of Justice, court approval to expand his investigation; the
three-judge panel supervising the scope of his investigation granted one of his
requests, see In re Espy, 80 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. 1996), and declined
the other, see In re Espy, 145 F.3d 1365 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. 1998).
6. LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FIREWALL: THE IRAN CONTRA CONSPIRACY AND
COVER-UP (1997).
7. For recent academic treatment of the problems related to the
independent counsel system, see The Independent Counsel Statute: A
Symposium, 49 MERCER L. REV. 427 (1998); Julie O'Sullivan, The Independent
Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463 (1996); Nick
Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court's New
Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1998). For an
extraordinarily interesting series of panel discussions on the independent
counsel system, see Symposium, The Independent Counsel Act: From
Watergate to Whitewater and Beyond, 86 GEO. L.J. 2011 (1998); Sixty-
Seventh Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent Counsel
Process: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1515 (1997). Recent controversy surrounding the investigation of President
Clinton's relationship with Monica Lewinsky has given rise to an outpouring
[Vol. 83:11971198
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Article is not to rehearse those criticisms as a policy matter
(although I agree with many of them); nor is my purpose to
rehearse past critiques of the constitutionality of the
independent counsel structure (although I agree with many of
them, too). My purpose instead is to examine a particularly
anomalous feature of the independent counsel system: it casts
different components of the executive branch into the position
of litigating against one another.
The independent counsel system makes possible, and
indeed approves of, litigation in Article Ill courts between the
President of the United States in his official capacity and an
independent counsel. It also makes possible litigation in which
the Department of Justice is adverse to the independent
counsel, both as amicus curiae and as counsel for a government
party. In this Article, I conclude that such litigation is not only
a bad idea, but that it gives rise to a serious constitutional
dilemma: it either violates Article III, because there is
insufficient adversity to support litigation between the parties;
or it violates Article II, both because in practical terms it
prevents the President and his subordinates from controlling
central functions of the executive branch, and because it also
places the independent counsel, an inferior officer, in a
constitutionally superior position not only to the Attorney
General but also to the President of the United States himself.
Somewhat paradoxically, the system also intrudes on Article H
values because it removes from the President the responsibility
and accountability for how the laws are executed. Either by
directly violating Article I's limitation of the judicial power to
cases or controversies, or by impinging on the values and
structure of Article H, the independent counsel system is
deeply violative of the constitutional structure.
of popular commentary critical of the system. For examples, see Akbil Reed
Amar, A Constitutional Nightmare, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1998, at Cl;
Shared Legacy: Presidency and Special Counsel Office Declining in Tandem,
HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 16, 1998, Outlook Sec., at 2; Benjamin Wittes, A Kiss of
Death for Independent Counsels, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1998, at A21; David
Dorsen, Starr's Clinton Investigation May Be Unconstitutional, THE HILL,
July 29, 1998, at 34; Lawrence M. Solan, Fault Lies Not Only in Starr but in
Law, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 20, 1998, at A19; John Ketcham, Editorial, Attorney
General Should Get Special 14-Year Term, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Mar.
16, 1998, at A8; Paul Simon, Too Close to the President, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 20, 1998, at B7; Dan Carney, Political Winds Shift
Independent Counsel Critics, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Nov. 23, 1997, at B3;
Editorial, Ed Meese's Revenge, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1997, at A12.
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In Part I, I set forth the real world circumstances in which
this constitutional dilemma arises through examples of
litigation in federal courts that bring into focus the reality of
this constitutional dilemma. In Part H, I analyze the Article
III implications of the legal structure, both decisional and
statutory, that has brought us to this point and offer a critique
of that structure. In Part III, I analyze the practical
implications of dividing Article H authority between the
President and his agents on one hand, and a series of
independent counsels on the other. Although the scope of this
paper does not permit a full consideration of the constitutional
question, I suggest that the Court in Morrison v. Olson8
underestimated the adverse consequences to the functioning of
the Article II branch of approving the constitutionality of the
independent counsel system.
I. LITIGATION BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
AND OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH
A. WATERGATE LITIGATION
Since Watergate there have been numerous instances of
litigation between independent counsels and their colleagues
in the executive branch.9 The most notable, of course, was
United States v. Nixon,10 in which the Supreme Court held that
President Nixon was required to comply with a trial subpoena
issued by Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworskill for tape
8. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
9. Nobody disputes that the independent counsel is part of the executive
branch, and indeed that his or her only charge is to aid in the execution of the
laws. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691.
10. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
11. During Watergate, the term "special prosecutor" was used to describe
the executive officer who was charged with investigating and prosecuting
certain crimes at the behest of the Attorney General. See United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694 n.8 (describing the appointment process and regulatory
basis for the jurisdiction of the Watergate Special Prosecutor). That term
continued to be used through the first iteration of the Ethics in Government
Act, but was abandoned in favor of the term 'independent counsel" upon the
statutes first renewal. See Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 2, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983). At
various times since 1978-particularly when the constitutionality of the
Ethics in Government Act had not been judicially settled, and in periods when
the law had lapsed-the Department of Justice provided by regulation for the
appointment of independent counsels. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1-600.5 (1997).
[Vol. 83:11971200
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recordings of certain Oval Office conversations involving the
President and his senior staff. The Court recognized (for the
first time) the constitutional legitimacy of executive privilege,
but held that the President's interest in confidential
communications must give way to a demonstrated need for
evidence in a criminal trial. I shall have much more to say
about Nixon in Part H, so for present purposes I just pause to
note that, although the subpoena in Nixon was issued to the
President in his private capacity, the privilege he attempted to
interpose was an official privilege that the President is entitled
to invoke only as President and only in the official interest of
the presidency. 12 Nixon thus was an example of the kind of
controversy that I am concerned with in this Article-litigation
between two members of the executive branch acting in their
official capacities.
B. INTRA-BRANCH LITIGATION INVOLVING INDEPENDENT
COUNSELS, 1974-1993
Between Watergate and the Clinton administration the
instances of litigation between an independent counsel and any
other component of the executive branch were few. Indeed, the
only direct litigation was between Independent Counsel
Lawrence Walsh and the Justice Department over the
technicalities of administering the Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA).13 Under CIPA, when a criminal
defendant seeks to introduce classified information into
evidence, the United States is entitled to file an interlocutory
appeal if a district court refuses its submission of substitution
evidence.' 4 In the CIPA litigation between Walsh and Attorney
General Thornburgh, the Attorney General's substitution
evidence had been rejected by the district courts involved, and
the Attorney General sought to take an interlocutory appeal as
CIPA entitles the United States to do.15 Walsh claimed that
the independent counsel statute gave him sole authority to
prosecute appeals in the name of the United States in cases in
which he was involved, and thus that the Attorney General
12. Although the matter has not been squarely addressed in court, it is
generally thought that invocations of executive privilege require the personal
action of the President of the United States. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d
729, 744 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
13. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1994).
14 See id. § 6.
15. See id. §§ 6-7(a).
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had no authority to participate in the litigation. In two cases,
courts agreed with Walsh, holding that the Attorney General
lacked statutory authorization to appeal a district court's
denial of the government's substitution evidence under CIPA.16
Both cases concluded that the independent counsel's statutory
authority independently to "appeal[ ] any decision of a court in
any case or proceeding in which [the] independent counsel
participates in an official capacity"17 denies the Attorney
General standing to prosecute appeals generally, and
particularly under CIPA, notwithstanding that statute's
provision to the United States a right to an interlocutory
appeal in this context.18
The only other dispute between the Attorney General on
behalf of the executive branch and independent counsels in the
Reagan-Bush years was in the litigation over the
constitutionality of the independent counsel statute, in which
various independent counsels defended the law's
constitutionality and the Justice Department attacked it.
Those issues came to a head in Morrison v. Olson, in which the
Department of Justice, purporting to represent the interests of
the United States, filed an amicus curiae brief on the side of
the subject of an independent counsel investigation who was
16. See United States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d 465, 471 (4th Cir. 1989);
United States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1441, 1441 (D.D.C. 1989). For a
discussion of these events, see John Q. Barrett, All or Nothing, or Maybe
Cooperation: Attorney General Power, Conduct, and Judgment in Relation to
the Work of an Independent Counsel, 49 MERCER L. REV. 519, 535-37 (1998).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(3) (1994).
18. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 7(a). Both courts noted, however, that the
Attorney General retained the statutory right under section 6(e) of CIPA to
file an affidavit obligating the defendant not to disclose the classified
material. See Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 470-71; North, 713 F. Supp. at 1441.
The district court decision denying the Attorney General standing was
affirmed by unpublished order on appeal. See LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS 111
(1993); see also Barrett, supra note 16, at 537 n.86. As Professor Barrett
recounts, the Attorney General did invoke that statutory authority in some
circumstances during the Iran-Contra investigation, with the result that two
counts of Walsh's case against Oliver North were dismissed, as well as his
entire indictment of Joseph Fernandez. See id. at 536-37. For general
treatments of the problems raised by the intersection between CIPA and the
independent counsel statute, see Sandra D. Jordan, Classified Information
and Conflicts in Independent Counsel Prosecutions: Balancing the Scales of
Justice After Iran-Contra, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1651 (1991); Ronald K Noble,
The Independent Counsel Versus the Attorney General in a Classified
Information Procedures Act-Independent Counsel Statute Case, 33 B.C. L.
REV. 539 (1992).
[Vol. 83:11971202
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asserting that the statute was unconstitutional. 19 Of course,
the Supreme Court upheld the statute over Justice Scalia's
lone dissent. I shall have much more to say about Morrison in
Part I, so I will pause only to note here that although that
case did not involve litigation between the President (as
represented by the Attorney General) and the independent
counsel as parties squared off against one another, it did
present the circumstance of two different views of the law
being taken in the Article I courts by different components of
the executive branch.
C. INTRA-BRANcH LITIGATION INVOLVING INDEPENDENT
COUNSELS, 1993-PRESENT
Since the Clinton Administration came to power in 1993,
there have been many more instances of litigation between
independent counsels and other components of the executive
branch.
1. Intra-Branch Litigation Involving Independent Counsel
Donald Smaltz
In 1994, Donald Smaltz was appointed as Independent
Counsel to investigate allegations that former Secretary of
Agriculture Mike Espy violated various federal criminal laws
in accepting certain favors and gratuities from persons or
entities with business before his Department.20 In the course
of his investigation, Smaltz issued grand jury subpoenas for
documents from the Office of White House Counsel21 reflecting
that Office's own investigation of Secretary Espy (directed
toward whether the President should fire or otherwise
discipline Espy). In response, the White House interposed a
variety of privilege claims, among them executive privilege.
The United States-represented by Smaltz22-- thus litigated
against the White House extremely serious and important
questions of executive privilege, which ultimately ended up in
a landmark decision from the D.C. Circuit that set the current
19. 487 U.S. 654, 659 (1988).
20. In re Espy, 145 F.3d 1365, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
21. Throughout this paper I use the term "White House" as a shorthand
for any component within the Office of the President under direct presidential
supervision.
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(9) (providing that the independent counsel
shall conduct litigation "in the name of the United States").
12031999]
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governing standard for how claims of executive privilege are
handled and resolved.23 (On the merits, the D.C. Circuit held
that some of the controverted documents needed to be
produced, and remanded for the district court to apply a "need
analysis" as to the rest.24)
At other points in his investigation, Smaltz twice
concluded that he had evidence of criminal violations by Espy
and others that were not specifically covered by his original
grant of prosecutorial jurisdiction, and therefore sought
approval to expand his investigation to cover those matters.
Under the statute, it is up to the Attorney General to
determine, after giving "great weight to any recommendations
of the independent counsel," whether the circumstances'
warrant expansion of the independent counsel's prosecutorial
authority.25 The statute otherwise provides for the court
supervising the independent counsel26 to expand his or her
jurisdiction if it determines that the new matters are "related
to the independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction."2 7
In the Espy matter, the Attorney General concluded in
both instances that the evidence of criminal violations obtained
by Smaltz was not sufficiently related to his original
jurisdiction and therefore declined his request for an expansion
of his authority. On both occasions, Smaltz then went to court
to seek to have the Special Division expand his jurisdiction as a
matter related to his existing jurisdiction; both times the
Attorney General opposed the independent counsel's
application. On one of the occasions, the Special Division sided
with Smaltz,28 and on the other occasion it sided with the
Attorney General.29  Thus, the Independent Counsel, an
inferior officer to the Attorney General, was again in litigation
23. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997). This case is
undoubtedly the most significant executive privilege decision by any court
since United States v. Nixon in 1974.
24. See id at 762.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2).
26. That court, known as the "Special Division," is made up of three
federal circuit judges, one of whom (and no more) must be sitting on the D.C.
Circuit, who are selected for the assignment by the Chief Justice of the United
States. See id. § 49(d).
27. Id. § 594(e).
28. See in re Espy, 80 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
29. See in re Espy, 145 F.3d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
[Vol. 83:11971204
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against the Attorney General, and both were acting in their
official capacities. 30
2. Intra-Branch Litigation Involving Independent Counsel
Kenneth W. Starr
Similar litigation has occurred in the investigation run by
Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr. In the last two years,
executive branch officials-in their official capacity-have
engaged in at least four pieces of litigation against the
independent counsel.
a. Eighth Circuit Government Attorney-Client Privilege
In 1997, the Office of Independent Counsel sought access
to notes taken by White House lawyers in meetings with First
Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton.31 The White House resisted the
grand jury subpoena for the notes, initially on the grounds of
both executive privilege and government attorney-client
privilege. After the independent counsel made clear that the
matter would be litigated, the White House dropped the claim
of executive privilege, but continued to press the claim of
government attorney-client privilege.
The Eighth Circuit subsequently held that there was no
government attorney-client privilege between White House
lawyers and the First Lady, and that the White House was not
entitled to withhold evidence sought by a federal prosecutor in
a grand jury investigation. 32 There could be no legal adversity
between the independent counsel and the White House in this
context, the court noted, since the interest of the White House
30. There is a good argument that the Espy cases described here were not
"cases" at all, but were rather instances of the Special Division acting in its
Article II capacity of appointing independent counsels. In fact, as a functional
matter, that view seems quite persuasive. The Special Division, on the other
hand, treated the disputes as litigation. The matters were briefed and
decisions were issued, which were in turn reported in the Federal Reporter.
In any event, the point remains that the Independent Counsel and the
Attorney General disagreed over a legal question, which was controverted and
conclusively resolved by a court-and not either the Attorney General or the
President within the executive branch itself. The statute does not resolve
whether the exercise of power in such circumstances by the Special Division is
executive or judicial in nature; it merely provides the mechanism of seeking
an expansion from the Special Division. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(c), (e).
31. Mrs. Clinton's personal lawyers also attended the meetings in
question.
32. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 922-23
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
1999] 1205
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as a government institution was the same as the interest of the
independent counsel-to ferret out and prosecute crime. Thus,
although the First Lady in her individual capacity is entitled to
have privileged communications with her private counsel, and
although she assuredly has an interest as an individual in
avoiding criminal prosecution, the White House lawyers have
no legitimate interest in serving those private interests of Mrs.
Clinton's. Thus, the Eighth Circuit held, the notes taken by
White House lawyers had to be turned over to the
prosecutors.33
The White House then sought certiorari and the
Department of Justice supported the petition as amicus
curiae;34 the Supreme Court nonetheless denied review. 35 The
uncomfortable Article III circumstances of the case are
illustrated by the name of the case in the Supreme Court.
When the White House filed its petition for certiorari, it
pointedly captioned the case "Office of the President v. Office of
Independent Counsel." The brief in opposition filed by the
independent counsel objected to this captioning of the case,
noting (correctly) that the Act provides explicitly that the
independent counsel is to litigate "in the name of the United
States," 36 and that the respondent in the case was therefore
required by law to be called the "United States" and not "Office
of Independent Counsel."37  Although the Court denied
certiorari without commenting on the dispute, it is worth
pausing over the lineup of the parties: the White House,
representing the President of the United States, sought
certiorari in a case against the independent counsel, the
inferior officer designated by law to investigate the matters at
hand and vindicate the prosecutorial interests of the United
States; the Attorney General, who serves at the pleasure of the
President, filed a brief supporting the President and opposing
the full investigation of potential federal crimes, while also
33. See id.
34. See Brief Amicus Curiae for the United States, Acting Through the
Attorney General Supporting Certiorari, Office of the President v. Office of
Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997) (No. 96-1783).
35. See Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S.
Ct. 2482 (1997) (denying petition for a writ of certiorari).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(9) (1994).
37. See Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition at 28-30, Office of
the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997) (No. 96-
1783).
[Vol. 83:11971206
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representing the interests of the United States. In short, this
litigation is a prime example of intra-branch litigation.
b. Lewinsky Phase: Executive Privilege and Government
Attorney-Client Privilege
There has been still more litigation of this sort involving
the executive branch and Independent Counsel Starr. In the
course of the Monica Lewinsky phase of Starr's investigation,
numerous additional privilege disputes arose. The first of
these was over executive privilege.38 Numerous grand jury
witnesses invoked executive privilege to refuse to testify about
matters related to President Clinton's relationship with Ms.
Lewinsky and the White House's response to the investigation.
In the first months of 1998, when the Lewinsky investigation
was in its early stages, White House staff members who
asserted executive privilege included Assistant to the
President Sidney Blumenthal, Deputy Counsel to the President
Bruce Lindsey, and Deputy Assistant to the President Nancy
Hernreich. 39 Mr. Lindsey also claimed government attorney-
client privilege, reflecting the White House's decision not to
follow the Eighth Circuit's decision on the matter from less
than a year before.40 The independent counsel thereafter filed
a motion to compel the testimony of these witnesses, which the
district court granted. The White House filed a notice of
appeal. Before the appeal could be heard, however, the
independent counsel filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
38. Although the term "executive privilege7 can be given a broad
meaning, in using that term in this Article, I mean it in its constitutional
form, that of presidential communications. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d
729, 744-45 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Although some of the executive privilege claims
made by the White House in the Lewinsky investigation covered the non-
constitutional deliberative process privilege, the distinction between these
branches of executive privilege law is not relevant for purposes of this Article.
See id. at 745-46 (detailing differences between branches of executive
privilege).
39. See COMMUNICATION FROM KENNETH W. STARR, INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL, H.R. DOC. NO. 105-310, at 207 (1998).
40. The Lewinsky grand jury before which Mr. Lindsey and the other
witnesses were called was empaneled in the District of Columbia; hence, the
Eighth Circuit law on government attorney-client privilege was not binding.
Former Deputy White House Counsel Jane Sherburne commented, however,
that she was "frankly stunned that, given that 8th Circuit decision out there,
that the White House [Counsers Office] would be involved" in dealing with the
Lewinsky matter. Ruth Marcus, White House Lawyer Role Faces Test; Does
Staff Serve President or Office?, WASH. POST, June 29, 1998, at A01.
12071999]
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before judgment,41 seeking immediate Supreme Court review of
both the executive privilege and government attorney-client
privilege aspects of the case. When the White House filed its
response to the independent counsel's petition, however, it
dropped the executive privilege claims altogether, and relied
solely on government attorney-client privilege as to Lindsey's
testimony.42 The Court thereafter denied certiorari before
judgment, noting that it expected the court of appeals to
resolve the matter expeditiously.4 3
In the court of appeals, the government attorney-client
privilege litigation between the White House and independent
counsel did indeed proceed expeditiously. The case was fully
briefed and argued in just a little more than three weeks,44 and
a month later the court of appeals held, agreeing with the
Eighth Circuit's decision from the year before, that the White
House's government attorney-client argument was without
merit.45 On the contrary, the court held, it would be a "gross
misuse of public assets" to permit government attorneys,
including lawyers for the White House, to be used as a "shield
against the production of information relevant to a federal
criminal investigation."46 The court of appeals thus affirmed
the district court's decision granting the independent counsel's
motion to compel Mr. Lindsey's testimony. Both the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court declined to stay that ruling,
and thus Mr. Lindsey and other members of the White House
Counsel's office were required to testify before the grand jury
investigating the Lewinsky matter.47 Several months later, the
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254.
42. See Peter Baker, Clinton May Drop Appeal on Privilege; Strategy
Could Avert Supreme Court Review, WASH. POST, June 1, 1998, at Al; Clinton
to Limit Legal Appeal; Executive Privilege Claim to Be Dropped, CHI. TRIB.,
June 1, 1998, at 1.
43. See United States v. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. 2079, 2080 (1998) (denying
petition for certiorari before judgment) (noting that the Court "assumed that
the Court of Appeals will proceed expeditiously to decide this case").
44. The Supreme Court denied certiorari before judgment on June 4,
1998, see id., and the court of appeals heard argument on June 29, 1998. See
In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
45. See Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1114.
46. Id. at 1110.
47. After their court losses in the Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit, and
while the White House's petition for certiorari was pending, the White House
and its lawyers refused to acquiesce in the court rulings and continued to
refuse to answer questions that they claimed were covered by the attorney-
client privilege. The Supreme Court denied review months later, see Office of
[Vol. 83:11971208
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Supreme Court denied the White House's petition for a writ of
certiorari. 49
In the wake of the Lindsey litigation, still more litigation
ensued between the White House and the independent counsel
over executive privilege and government attorney-client
privilege. Subsequent White House witnesses in the grand
jury continued not only to invoke attorney-client privilege to
support their refusal to answer questions about the Lewinsky
matter, the witnesses-including Bruce Lindsey himself,
whose testimony had been the subject of the earlier withdrawn
appeal as the independent counsel's petition for certiorari
before judgment was pending-reasserted executive privilege.
The events that followed, including Starr's referral of
potentially impeachable matters to the House of
Representatives, apparently overtook that litigation. But so
far as the public record is concerned, Bruce Lindsey and other
White House witnesses-including lawyers Cheryl Mills and
Lanny Breuer-ultimately succeeded in avoiding testifying
fully about the Lewinsky matter before the grand jury.
The final category of litigation between Starr's office and
the White House is the litigation over Secret Service testimony.
Early in the Lewinsky investigation, the independent counsel
decided to seek information about President Clinton's
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky from Secret Service officers
who might have knowledge of the facts. The Secret Service
strongly resisted providing information, and thus two executive
branch entities-the Office of Independent Counsel and the
United States Secret Service, which is part of the Department
of Treasury49-embarked upon negotiations over the
submission of evidence to a federal grand jury. A third
executive branch entity, the Department of Justice,
represented the Secret Service in the negotiations and the
litigation that followed.50
The Secret Service claimed that its mission of protecting
the President would inevitably be compromised if its officers
the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
48. See id.
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (1994).
50. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (1994) (general assignment of responsibility
to Attorney General for representing in court the United States and its
agencies); 28 C.F.R. § 0.45 (1997) (assignment to Civil Division of the
Department of Justice to represent the United States and its agencies in
litigation involving the government's legal rights and responsibilities).
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were forced to disclose in any forum, including a federal grand
jury, facts about what they observed in the course of
discharging their protective function. Thus, the agency
argued, with the support of the Justice Department, a new
"protective function privilege" should be recognized under
Federal Rule of Evidence 501.5' The independent counsel's
view was that Secret Service officers have a dual mission-not
only to protect the President (and others), but also to fulfill
their duties as sworn law enforcement officers.52 There was no
incompatibility, the independent counsel claimed, between the
protective function of the Secret Service and its law
enforcement function.5 3 For its part, the Secret Service claimed
(again, with the support and legal counsel of the Justice
Department) that its protective function would be
undermined-to the point of a likelihood that someday in the
future a President of the United States would be
assassinated-if its officers were forced to divulge information
they learned in the course of their protective duties.54
After negotiations over the testimony broke down, the
independent counsel filed a motion to compel the testimony.
The district court ruled against the Secret Service,55 and the
Justice Department appealed to the D.C. Circuit. As that
appeal was pending, the independent counsel again filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment.56  The
Supreme Court denied that petition at the same time it denied
51. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (authorizing the courts of the United States to
recognize new evidentiary privileges in a common law manner in light of
"reason and experience").
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056.
53. See Brief of Appellee United States, In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (No. 98-3069).
54. See Brief for the Appellant, In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (No. 98-3069).
55. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7734
(D.D.C. May 22, 1998), affd, In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
reh'g en banc denied, 146 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
461 (1998).
56. In contrast to the lower court practice of generically captioning
litigation arising out of grand jury proceedings, the practice in the Supreme
Court is to name the parties to the dispute. Thus, the independent counsel's
petition was captioned, "United States v. Robert Rubin, Secretary of the
Treasury"; that caption reflected the fact that the independent counsel is
charged with litigating in the name of the United States, see 28 U.S.C. §
594(a)(9), and Secretary Rubin's official action in asserting the would-be
protective function privilege. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1074.
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the government attorney-client privilege petition that the
independent counsel had earlier filed.57 Again proceeding
expeditiously, the D.C. Circuit ordered briefing and argument
to be completed in just over three weeks, and issued its
decision rejecting the Secret Service and Justice Department's
claims less than two weeks later.5 8 The Justice Department
sought rehearing en banc from the D.C. Circuit, which was
denied without any judge calling for a vote;59 the Justice
Department then sought a stay, which the Chief Justice
denied;60 the full Court later denied the Justice Department's
petition for a writ of certiorari. 61
I. ARTICLE Ill AND INTRA-BRANCH LITIGATION
INVOLVING THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
Throughout the legal disputes that I have recounted thus
far, the oddness of the alignment of the parties was little noted.
With the notable exception of United States v. Nixon,62 none of
the cases so much as mentioned the -potential Article III
problems raised by the litigation.6 3 The reason why that is so,
of course, is that Nixon itself is taken to have resolved any
doubts about the propriety under Article III of litigation
between the independent counsel and other components of the
executive branch. My purpose in this part is to unpack and
analyze Nixon's holding on this point, as well as the
surrounding Article I law. My argument here is that the
provisions of law authorizing litigation between the
independent counsel and other components of the executive
branch are what save their disputes from lacking Article MI
57. See United States v. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. 2079 (1998) (denying
independent counsel's petition for certiorari before judgment on both secret
service and government attorney-client privilege claims).
58. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 461 (1998).
59. See In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir.) (denying petition for
rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
60. See Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1 (1998) (opinion in chambers).
61. See Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 119 S.
Ct. 461 (1998).
62. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
63. In a separate opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc in
the secret service case, Judge Laurence Silberman argued forcefully that the
Justice Department lacked standing to press the claim of privilege. See In re
Sealed Case, 146 F.3d at 1031-32 (Silberman, J., concurring). I shall have
more to say below about Judge Silberman's opinion.
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adversity. In other words, it is the law-in the form of
regulations issued by the Justice Department in Nixon, and in
the form of the independent counsel statute with respect to
subsequent events-that creates legal adversity between the
independent counsel and, say, the White House or Attorney
General. Although I don't believe that Article HI adversity can
be created merely by the issuance of a regulation, Congress can
create adversity by statute. Thus, while the holding of Nixon is
highly dubious, the Ethics in Government Act does
constitutionally permit intra-executive litigation involving
independent counsels. In Part I, my task will be to point out
the tremendous costs to Article H values exacted by the law's
purchase of Article I adversity.
A. LEGAL ADVERSITY WITHIN THE ExEcUTIVE BRANCH
It is basic law, of course, that Article I requires legal
adversity between the parties to a case or controversy. Thus,
feigned or collusive cases,64 test cases framed by Congress, 65
and other circumstances where the parties before the court are
not legally adverse 66 are beyond the power of Article HI courts
to decide. The Supreme Court has not spoken expansively on
what makes parties legally adverse, having resorted to
generalizations that the dispute between them must be
"concrete" and "legal" in nature.67 As Justice Black noted,
however, it is a truism that "no person may sue himself,"
because courts "do not engage in the academic pastime of
rendering judgments in favor of persons against themselves."68
That notion is deeply connected to the core Article M value
prohibiting advisory opinions.69
64. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (per
curiam). See generally ERWIN CHEMERiNsKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.2(2d ed. 1994).
65. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362-63 (1911).
66. See, e.g., Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 64, at 47-51; RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART
& WECHSLER'S FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 99-123 (4th ed.
1996).
67. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962).
68. United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426,430 (1949).
69. See, e.g., Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 408; Muskrat, 219 U.S. at
346. The requirement of Article I adversariness makes it unconstitutional
for a corporation to sue itself. See South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v.
Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U.S. 300, 300-01 (1892):
[Slince the decision in the Circuit Court the control of both of the
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When, then, is it permissible for the government to litigate
against itself? 0 I argue in this section that the proper analysis
of whether litigation impermissibly involves the executive
branch against itselfW1 ordinarily depends on two features. The
first is whether one or the other of the parties to the suit is not
litigating in his or her official capacity. If both actors are
acting in their official capacity, that very feature-again, recall
that we are talking about an intra-executive dispute-raises
serious questions about whether the parties can be legally
adverse for purposes of Article Im. But if one of the parties is
litigating in his or her individual capacity-say, an employee
suing his or her government employer for unlawful
discrimination-then on its face such a suit is not intra-branch
in nature and thus presents no problems of lack of legal
adversity.72 Second, even if both parties are litigating in their
official capacities, the presence of legal adversity depends upon
whether some source of law has removed from one of the
parties, or from the President of the United States, the power
conclusively to resolve the dispute.
The most prominent and extended judicial discussion of
this question came in United States v. ICC,73 in which the
Court found justiciable a controversy between the United
States and the Interstate Commerce Commission in which the
United States challenged a Commission order made to it in its
capacity as a shipper in interstate commerce. As others have
noted,74 that case, as well as most others raising this issue,75
involved an order of an independent agency in which the real
corporations, parties to this suit, had come into the hands of the
same persons.. the present managers and owners of the properties
were anxious that the question should be decided .... We cannot,
however, consent to determine a controversy in which the plaintiff in
error has become the dominus litis on both sides .... [Tihe litigation
has ceased to be between adverse parties.
70. For a thorough and illuminating analysis of this question, see Michael
Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue
Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893 (1991).
71. For purposes of this Article, I take it for granted that interbranch
litigation-say, between Congress and the President-poses minimal, if any,
Article M difficulties. See id. at 910-14.
72. See id. at 961; see also id. at 922 n.105, 971 n.300; Lee A. Albert &
Larry G. Simon, Enforcing Subpoenas Against the President: The Question of
Mr. Jaworski's Authority, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 546-47 (1974).
73. 337 U.S. 426 (1949).
74. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 104 n.5.
75. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153 (1953).
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party in interest was not the agency but a third party outside
the government. Thus, in ICC, the "basic question [was]
whether railroads have illegally exacted sums of money from
the United States." 6 The Court emphasized that if the parties
to a dispute in substance were legally adverse, then the fact
that eo nomine they might be within the same branch of the
government did not preclude Article III jurisdiction.77 But
even if the real party in interest in such cases were another
component of the executive branch, these cases are perfectly
consistent with an Article Ill theory that judges the parties'
legal adversity by reference to the law governing their
relationship. Thus, the provisions of law making the ICC
independent of the control of the "United States" as a
shipper-which on the facts was the United States Army 78-as
well as from direct presidential control, indicate that Congress
had created a legal regime in which the parties within the
executive branch did not have the power conclusively to resolve
their legal differences.7 9 This theory of Article III adversity,
then, depends on the provisions of law that take out of the
disputants' hands the power conclusively to resolve their
disputes. If Congress has the power to insulate from direct
presidential control the manner in with the ICC executes the
law-which is a conclusion that has of course been widely
historically disputed, but which I assume to be true for
purposes of this part of the Article-then there is no Article III
problem with the courts hearing a case between the ICC and
other components of the executive branch, including the United
States Army.80
76. 337 U.S. at 430; see Secretary ofAgric. v. United States, 350 U.S. 162
(1956) (adjudicating dispute over validity of ICC regulations governing
liability for eggs broken during railroad transit, without noting any potential
problem of intra-executive dispute).
77. See ICC, 337 U.S. at 430.
78. See id. at 428-29.
79. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. § 409 (1979); Resolution of
Legal Dispute Between the Department of Energy and the Tennessee Valley
Authority, 11 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 70 (1987) (indicating the view that two
executive agencies whose heads serve at the pleasure of the President must
submit their legal disputes to the Attorney General for resolution); see also
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 692 (1987) (holding that
the dispute was to be resolved administratively).
80. As I shall argue in Part m, this conclusion does not necessarily get
the regime established by Congress out of the constitutional woods. The fact
that the situation in ICC did not violate Article I does not mean that it did
not violate Article H; indeed, the very act of creating Article HI adversity
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In light of these general principles, I now turn to the
particular subject of my focus in this Article-disputes between
the independent counsel (or special prosecutor) and the
Attorney General or President over the conduct of a federal
criminal investigation.
B. NixoN AND ARTICLE III
United States v. Nixon 8' remains the Court's most
extended discussion of the justiciability of intra-branch
disputes over federal criminal law enforcement. The
circumstances leading up to the case are well-known, of course,
so there is no need for me to recount any more than the basics
here; my focus is on the Article Ill aspects of the decision, not
the case's substantive executive privilege holding. The
litigation between Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski and
President Nixon made its way through the district court and
into the court of appeals largely as a repeat of earlier litigation
between the President and former Special Prosecutor Cox over
the President's amenability to a grand jury subpoena.82 The
second litigation, however, contained a different twist-a claim
by the President that the matter was non-justiciable because it
was an intra-branch dispute that he alone had the power to
resolve.83
As Professor Bobbitt has noted, "it [is] certainly arguable
that no sufficient adversity could exist" between the President
and another officer of the executive branch.84 Yet the Court
raises substantial Article II concerns.
81. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
82. See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc). After the
court of appeals ordered him to comply with a grand jury subpoena for certain
tape recordings in Sirica, President Nixon decided not to appeal, but instead
partially to comply while also ordering Cox not to seek any more such
evidence in the future. It was the refusal of Cox to accept these directives
that resulted in his firing and all that followed. See KATY J. HARRIGER,
INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 19 (1992).
83. See UNITED STATES v. NIXON: THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT 337-50 (Leon Friedman ed., 1974) (reprinting President Nixon's brief
in the Supreme Court).
84. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 212-13 (1982). Professor
Bobbitt also characterized the Court's opinion in Nixon (which reached a
result with which he ultimately agreed) as being comprised of the "worst set
of doctrinal arguments-the least convincing, the most easily refuted, brief
but repetitious, bombastic but unmoving-one is likely to encounter in the
recent volumes of the United States Reports." Id. at 212.
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curtly rejected the President's argument, concluding that the
intra-branch nature of the dispute posed no justiciability
barrier. After first noting that the Court's practice has never
been to treat the formal alignment of the parties as
determinative of Article III justiciability,85 the Court proceeded
to analyze the sources of law which produced legal adversity
between the parties.
Those sources included the statutory charge to the
Attorney General to litigate criminal cases in the name of the
United States,86 and to appoint subordinates to aid him in the
discharge of that duty.87 Moreover, exercising that authority,
the Attorney General had in fact issued regulations delegating
to the Special Prosecutor his authority over the criminal
investigation arising out of the Watergate break-in.88 Those
regulations, the Court emphasized, bound not only the
executive branch, but also "the United States as the sovereign
composed of the three branches. 89 Until those regulations
were rescinded, the Special Prosecutor had the lawful
authority to litigate privilege claims against the President, and
the President himself was powerless to dictate otherwise.90
Finally, the Court emphasized that there was concrete
adversity between the President and the Special Prosecutor
over the evidence in question and ultimately concluded "[i]n
light of the uniqueness of the setting in which the conflict
arises," the intra-branch nature of the dispute posed no barrier
to its justiciability.91
Thus the Court identified a number of factors-both legal
and practical-that created legal adversity between the
President and the Special Prosecutor. Let us consider their
impact on the Article III analysis.
1. Statutory Charge to the Attorney General
The first factor relied upon by the Nixon Court-the
statutory charge to the Attorney General to execute the
85. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693.
86. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1994).
87. See id. §§ 509-510, 515, 519.
88. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694-95 & nn.8-9. The regulations governing
Justice Department appointment of special prosecutors (now, independent
counsels) can be found at 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1-600.5 (1997).
89. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 696.
90. See id. at 695-97.
9L Id. at 697.
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criminal laws in the name of the United States-is an
unpersuasive source for demonstrating legal adversity between
the President and the Special Prosecutor because it proves too
much. The Court's argument was essentially that the Special
Prosecutor stood in the shoes of the Attorney General, who was
the officer charged by law with determining what evidence
would be sought in the course of a federal criminal
investigation. 92 The Court's suggestion, then, was that the
President would have been powerless to resist a subpoena even
from the Attorney General.93 There was a crucial distinction,
of course, between the status of the Attorney General and the
Special Prosecutor-the Attorney General served at the
pleasure of the President. Thus, although as a technical
matter the statutory authority granted to the Attorney General
by Congress did not permit the President himself to prosecute
crimes in the name of the United States, the President had
substantial control simply by virtue of the fact that he was the
Attorney General's boss. 94
Some have argued that although the President might
theoretically have control over the Attorney General's conduct,
as a practical matter that control is nonexistent. 95 It is
undoubtedly true that the President's control is indirect. For
example, the President cannot himself appear in Court in the
name of the United States, or dictate who will; Congress by law
has given the Attorney General that power.96  But the
President has the power to direct the Attorney General's
92. See id. at 694-95.
93. Others have agreed with this suggestion, noting that the Attorney
General's power exists in law even though the President might effectively
have the power to influence, to the point of insistence, how it is used. See
Leonard G. Ratner, Executive Privilege, Self Incrimination, and the
Separation of Powers Illusion, 22 UCLA L. REv. 92, 101-03 (1974).
94. Although the President surely has the power to dismiss the Attorney
General for any reason or no reason, the power to direct the activities of
cabinet officers does not extend so far as to allow the President to order the
Attorney General to violate the law as set forth by Congress. See Kendall v.
United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). If there is a good faith basis for
disagreement between the President and his or her subordinates, however,
the President is generally entitled to insist that the cabinet officer defer on
pain of dismissal.
95. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 70, at 919-30; Ratner, supra note 93, at
102. As this article was in its final editing, a symposium on government
lawyering was published, see Symposium, Government Lawyering, 61 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1998); some of the symposium contributions are on
topics related to issues I discuss in this article.
96. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 515, 519 (1994).
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conduct in his or her discharge of that statutory function. So,
too, with the other statutory functions of the Attorney General;
so long as that officer serves at the pleasure of the President,
and I am unaware of any suggestion that he or she does not,
9 7
then the President ultimately has the power to control what
the Attorney General does.98 The President's ultimate power of
control is rarely invoked, and properly so. But, as the Court
has consistently maintained in its separation of powers
jurisprudence, the power to remove is nonetheless the power to
control. 99 Moreover, even if the President does not frequently
need to invoke his removal authority, it is reasonable to expect
the Attorney General to conduct herself in a way that will
please him; in this way, the President has substantial control
over the conduct of the Attorney General in discharging her
statutory functions. In the case of the Attorney General the
President has the power of removal, and therefore the power to
control her conduct. That is simply not true of executive
branch actors who have been granted tenure in office
independent of the whim of the President; indeed, that is the
whole point of insulating such actors from removal at the
President's pleasure.
Professor Herz discounts this argument, arguing that the
justiciability concerns are the same whether or not the parties
before the court are executive agencies (i.e., agencies headed by
97. See, e.g., Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254,262 (1922) (noting that the
Attorney General serves at the pleasure of the President.).
98. It might well be that the power to direct the Attorney General's
functions, on pain of removal, is limited. For example, it might constitute an
obstruction of justice for the President to direct the course of a criminal
investigation for private, rather than public, purposes. But even if the
President engages in such misconduct-using his public office for private
criminal purposes-it still seems clear that any action by him discharging an
Attorney General for refusing to go along would be legally effective. Cf. Nader
v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973) (issuing declaratory judgment that
the firing of Archibald Cox was illegal but granting no remedy).
99. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976). The decision in Bowsher provides particularly strong support
for the notion that the statutory assignment of fimctions to the Attorney
General doesn't create adversity between her and the President. In that case,
the Court struck down the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction statute
because it gave an executive role to the Comptroller General of the United
States, who was otherwise removable for cause by a joint resolution of
Congress. Even though that removal authority had lain dormant for 60 years,
and even though it required the mustering of a veto-proof majority of
Congress to invoke, the Court concluded that even that limited removal
authority gave Congress impermissible control over the execution of the laws.
[Vol. 83:11971218
UNITED STATES V. NIXON
persons removable at will by the President) or independent
agencies (i.e., agencies headed by persons removable only for
cause).100 He notes (and I have no quarrel with this) that the
degree of presidential control of executive agencies is
frequently less than is assumed, while the degree of control
over independent agencies is frequently more. 101 But he goes
on to say that this therefore establishes that "[als a practical
matter, the President has identical control over litigation by
independent and executive agencies,"102 and thus that the
Article I concerns when such agencies are involved in intra-
branch litigation are the same. He urges that the question
should be answered by reference to the substantive provisions
of law that grant, or do not grant, the agencies sufficient
freedom to litigate against an executive branch counterpart. 103
This argument is overstated as both a practical and
theoretical matter. First, it is not the case that the President
has "identical control" over litigation involving executive and
independent agencies. Two contrasting examples from the
tenure of President George Bush suffice to make the point. In
late 1991, a school desegregation case involving Mississippi's
treatment of its historically black colleges under federal law
was pending in the Supreme Court. The United States,
through Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr, had taken the
position that to remedy past discrimination in funding
historically black colleges, the State was not required to
provide extra funding to ensure the continued existence of the
black colleges.104 After a lobbying effort by civil rights groups,
however, President Bush directed Starr to disavow the
government's position and instead argue that the State had a
duty to remedy historic disparities in funding.105 The Solicitor
General, who was removable at will by the President,
complied. 106 In another incident late in President Bush's
tenure, the Board of Governors of the U.S. Postal Service--
100. See Herz, supra note 70, at 947-56.
101 See id. at 951-54; see also Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence:
Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV.
255 (1994).
102. Herz, supra note 70, at 954.
103. See id. at 955-56.
104. The case was United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
105. See Linda Greenhouse, Bush Reverses U.S. Stance Against Black
College Aid, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1991, at B6.
106. See id.
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officers who could be removed by the President only for cause-
asserted the authority to litigate independently of the control
of the Justice Department. After the Postal Service refused to
back down, President Bush directly ordered the Governors to
withdraw their litigating position and to cooperate with the
Attorney General in the litigation in question; the President
stated that if they failed to comply he would exercise his
authority to remove them for cause. 07 Believing that Congress
had granted the Postal Service independent litigating
authority, the Board of Governors refused to comply with the
President's direction.08  Subsequently, the Governors
succeeded in enjoining the President from removing them,10 9
and in establishing as a matter of law their right to litigate
contrary to Justice Department direction." 0
These anecdotes illustrate the significant differences
between the President's ability to control litigation by those
whom he can remove at will and those whom he cannot. In the
first instance, a simple telephone call sufficed to persuade the
Solicitor General to take the extraordinary step of withdrawing
a legal position on which he had personally signed off in the
Supreme Court. In the other, multiple rounds of litigation,
coupled with direct orders to the agency in question, resulted
in the President failing to impose his will on an independent
agency.
Contrary to Professor Herz's argument, then, these
examples demonstrate that independence can make a practical
difference in the real world. It seems reasonable to conclude at
the very least that a determined President's ability to control
the course of government litigation depends on the
independence of the officers who have been charged by law
107. See Mackie v. Bush, 809 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot, 10
F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In this case, the Governors obtained an injunction
against the President directing him not to exercise his removal authority until
the pending primary injunction litigation was resolved. For an excellent
discussion of these events, and of the legal and political complexities involved
in executive branch control of agency litigation, see Neal Devins, Political Will
and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency Independent?,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273 (1993).
108. This is a belief that they succeeded in establishing as law in the D.C.
Circuit. See Mail Order Ass'n v. U.S. Postal Service, 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
109. See Mackie, 809 F. Supp. at 144.
110. See Mail Order Ass'n, 986 F.2d at 509.
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with conducting the litigation.M Although Professor Herz
provides a powerful and nuanced account of the multiple ways
in which independent agencies are not truly independent, and
in which executive agencies as a practical matter are,112 the
absence of formal legal barriers to the President's
accomplishing his goals in the latter situation counts for
everything when the stakes are high enough for the President
to insist on getting his way.
The theoretical objection to Professor Herz's position rests
on its failure to come to terms with the significance of the
Court's separation of powers jurisprudence. As I noted
earlier, 113 the Supreme Court has taken a rigorously formal
view of the significance of the removal power and the ability to
control. Taking as a premise that Congress cannot control the
execution of the laws, the Court in Bowsher insisted that the
congressional power to remove the Comptroller General-
which could only be exercised for specified reasons and only by
passing a joint resolution-was an impermissible
encroachment on the executive if the Comptroller had any role
in executing the laws.1 14 That was so even though no law gave
the Congress any say in how the Comptroller discharged his
executive functions; it was enough for the Court that the
Comptroller was subject to congressional removal if he failed to
please Congress in executing the laws. 115
It follows from Bowsher that, as a matter of constitutional
law, the President has the power to control the Attorney
General's discharge of her statutory functions by virtue of his
power to remove her if he is displeased with her
111. It is a quite different point, and not one that undermines my
argument in text, that the President rarely sees fit to exert whatever
influence he has. I also should add that in the normal course of government
business it might well be that the President exercises the same degree of
control (which is to say little) over the litigating decisions of both executive
and independent officers. But the test of the legal principles involves is in the
hard case, where the stakes are high enough for the parties to take, or
consider taking, their intra-executive disputes to an Article M court.
112. See Herz, supra note 70, at 951-54; see also 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADmmSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.5 (3d ed. 1994);
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 641-43 (1984).
113. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
114. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); see also Lawrence Lessig
& Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 11-12 (1994).
115. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 114, at 111.
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performance.1 6 Assuming that it would not constitute good
cause for removal if the head of an agency refused to follow the
President's directions as to how to execute the law,117 the
difference between executive and independent agencies thus
seems to make all the difference. In the one instance it is hard
to see why an Article III court should intervene if the President
has the complete constitutional and legal authority to direct
the result; in the other instance, the law, as passed by
Congress, has removed that power from the President, and
thus there is no party outside the Article III courts with the
legal authority conclusively to resolve the dispute.
To bring the discussion back to Nixon, what this means is
that the statutory creation of the office of Attorney General,
and the charge to prosecute crimes in the name of the United
States, do not in themselves create adversity between the
President and Attorney General should they disagree over how
to execute the federal criminal law. It is undoubtedly true that
Congress, through its lawmaking power, substantially
influences how the law is executed.11 8 But that lawmaking
power is tempered by the default rule-that Congress has not
116. It might be argued that the Court is properly more attentive to the
control that exists simply by virtue of the possibility of removal because of the
inter-branch nature of the context in Bowsher. On reflection, however, it
seems that feature ought more reasonably to cut the other way. In the
situation of the Comptroller General, Congress's removal authority had not
been used during the 60-year existence of the office prior to the passage of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act that extended that officer's duties to include
the execution of the law; it would have been quite surprising and jarring for
Congress suddenly to interfere with how the Comptroller discharged his
duties. In contrast, there is nothing at all unusual about the prospect of the
President seeking to control the exercise of powers by those whom he has the
power to remove. I would suppose he does that every day.
117. I recognize that this premise is highly disputable-and indeed seems
at war with Bowsher. I will consider this question further in Part m. I note
preliminarily, though, that the very purpose of the good cause removal
provision in the Ethics in Government Act is to liberate from presidential
direction any significant prosecutorial decision. See Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); S. REP. No. 97-496 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3553 (noting that the good cause
removal provision was to be invoked "in only extreme, necessary cases"). For
an elaborate and illuminating argument as to why it might constitute good
cause for removal if a subordinate officer disobeyed the President's directions
regarding law enforcement decisions, see John F. Manning, The Independent
Counsel Statute: Reading Good Cause in Light of Article II, 83 MINN. L. REV.
1285 (1999).
118. See Ratner, supra note 93, at 102.
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seen fit to alter in this context-that the Attorney General
serves at the pleasure of the President. 119
2. Regulatory Delegation of Independence and Tenure to the
Special Prosecutor
The second, and most significant, source for the Court's
holding that there was legal adversity between President
Nixon and Jaworski was the regulatory grant of independence
and tenure in office to Jaworski.120 The Court firmly concluded
that those regulations had the "force of law" so long as they
were on the books, and thus bound not only the President but
the entire United States government.12' Because the
regulations as a matter of substance gave Jaworski the power
to issue subpoenas even to the President, and as a matter of
procedure gave up the Attorney General's power (and therefore
the President's power) to remove Jaworski for anything but
extraordinary cause, the Court held that there was legal
adversity sufficient to satisfy Article HI.122
To support that holding, the Court cited a number of cases
which on first blush seem consistent with the finding of
justiciability. For example, in United States ex rel. Accardi v.
Shaughnessy,123 the Attorney General sought to review an
action by the Board of Immigration Appeals, a body to which
119. The lack of any congressional action to limit the President's removal
power over the Attorney General is what prevents there being Article HI
adversity between them. If Congress did see fit to impose limits, then the
Article HI problems would be greatly mitigated. That is not to say, of course,
that there wouldn't be enormous Article I objections to such congressional
action. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-92; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); see also Paul J. Mishkin,
Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L.
REV. 76, 82-83 (1974); William Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional
Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REv. 116, 132 (1974).
120. The regulations at issue in Nixon were issued by the Attorney
General at the time of Jaworski's appointment to guarantee him the "greatest
degree of independence" allowed by law and that he would not be removed
"except for extraordinary improprieties on his part" and then only after the
President garnered a consensus of Congressional leaders agreeing that he
should be removed. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694 n.8 (1974)
(citing 38 Fed. Reg. 30,739 (1973)). Similar regulations (though not including
the necessity of garnering congressional approval for a dismissal) have
consistently been issued by the Attorney General ever since. For the current
version, see 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1-600.5 (1997).
121. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 695-96.
122. See id. at 696-97.
123. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
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he had by regulation delegated the power to resolve the matter
in dispute. Notwithstanding the discretionary nature of those
regulations, and the undenied fact that the Attorney General
could repeal those regulations any time he pleased, the Court
held that the Attorney General had no power to act contrary to
the regulations so long as they remained on the books. Other
cases from the Supreme Court,124 as well as the lower courts, 125
confirm the principle that agencies are bound to follow their
own regulations. 126
On analysis, however, the cases do not fully support the
Court's holding in Nixon.127 While it is indeed hornbook law
that agencies are bound by their own regulations, the most
common circumstance in which that question arises is when
individuals, whether parties outside the government or
government employees acting in their individual capacity, have
interests at stake. Each case cited by the Nixon Court for the
proposition that the Attorney General's regulations created
legal adversity-Service v. Dulles,128 Vitarelli v. Seaton,129 and
124. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S.
535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); see also 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, JR., supra
note 112, § 6.5; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.9 (3d ed. 1991).
But see American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 539
(1970) ("M[It is always within the discretion of a court or an administrative
agency to relax or modify its own procedural rules adopted for the orderly
transaction of business before it when in a given case the ends of justice
require it. The action of either in such a case is not reviewable except upon a
showing of substantial prejudice to the complaining party."). For a general
analysis of when agency regulations are considered binding, see Peter Raven-
Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel: When Agencies Break Their Own "Laws", 64
TEX. L. REV. 1 (1985).
125. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Secretary of Defense, 41 F.3d 738, 741 (2nd Cir.
1994) (Army); Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2nd Cir. 1991) (Immigration
and Naturalization Service); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 787 F.2d 965,
977 (5th Cir. 1986) (Environmental Protection Agency); Rose v. Secretary of
the Dep't of Labor, 800 F.2d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 1986) (Labor Department).
126. One court has held that the Accardi doctrine is dictated by due
process. See Wilkinson v. Legal Servs. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 32, 35 (D.D.C.
1998) ("[The Accardi doctrine derives from the Due Process Clause's
obligation that government agencies follow the law.").
127. This point is more than an academic problem. Many anticipate that
the Ethics in Government Act will not be renewed (or will be substantially
modified) when it expires this year. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994). If that
occurs, and we return to the purely regulatory system of the Watergate and
1992-1994 years, these questions will likely become practically very
important.
128. 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
129. 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
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Accardi'30-falls into these categories. Service and Vitarelli
involved the question whether regulations setting the terms on
which government employees could be discharged bound the
government in the sense that a discharge in violation of them
was unlawful; Accardi involved the question whether the
Attorney General was bound not to interfere with the
adjudication of disputes which he had delegated to the Board of
Immigration Appeals the power to resolve. The Court held
that the government was bound, and that the individuals
involved had a cause of action. 131 In each instance, the
government had bound itself to deal with an employee or
individual in a prescribed way prior to taking certain actions
against them, but only as individuals.132
The situation in Nixon was different. Jaworski was not
litigating over the subpoena to the President in his individual
capacity; on the contrary, he was exercising public authority
that would have been the Attorney General's absent the
regulations at issue. Under the Nixon holding, the regulations
were akin to an act of Congress limiting the power of the
President and Attorney General. And although Congress had
authorized the Attorney General to delegate his power to
subordinates, 33  it would be quite odd to treat that
authorization as including with it the ability to create a legal
controversy between two parties in their official capacities
where one would not, and indeed could not, otherwise exist.34
130. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
13L See Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 540-46; Service, 354 U.S. at 388-89; Accardi,
347 U.S. at 265-67.
132. The Court has adopted this rationale explicitly. See Morton v. Ruiz,
415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) ("Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is
incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures."). The point is
further amplified by the recent district court decision in Wilkinson v. Legal
Services Corp., where the court observed that "[in each case [of the Accardi
line] the Court inquired into the purpose of the regulations that the agency
allegedly violated, and found that the party relying on the Accardi doctrine
was in the class of persons for whose benefit the regulations had been
promulgated." 27 F. Supp. 2d. 32, 52 (D.D.C. 1998). The court relied on a
variety of cases for that proposition. See id. (citing Yellin v. United States,
374 U.S. 109, 115 (1963); Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 540; Service, 354 U.S. at 373;
Accardi, 347 U.S. at 268; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152 (1945); Arizona
Grocery v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry Co., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932); United States
ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1923)).
133. See 28 U.S.C. § 515, 519.
134. This point is made more clear by thinking of the normal situation in
which subordinates of the Attorney General exercise delegated power. The
Justice Department has a host of regulations on the books dividing up the
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To put the point another way, Nixon seems to stand for the
proposition that a collusive lawsuit is permissible so long as
the agreement to collude is in the form of a regulation. The
prior cases, however, do not stand for so much. Instead, they
support the proposition that the government can bind itself-in
something akin to a contract-in how it deals with individuals.
If the Attorney General had fired Jaworski in violation of the
regulations, then it seems clear that under Accardi, Service,
and Vitarelli he would have had a claim in his individual
capacity. 3 5 It is quite different to say that the regulations
would allow the Attorney General and Special Prosecutor to
litigate over the scope of Jaworski's authority as set by internal
Justice Department regulations.
Here an analogy to the corporate law is illuminating. As
Professor Herz has noted, the fact that a corporation cannot
sue itself is not ordained in nature, but is instead a substantive
component of what it means in law to be a corporation.136 If the
Chevrolet Division of General Motors Corporation seeks
information from the Oldsmobile Division, and the latter
resists, they are not entitled to litigate over the matter because
there is an authority outside the courts with conclusive
authority to resolve the dispute-the central management of
General Motors. 137 In the same way, no matter how much the
functions that have been statutorily granted to the Attorney General to
perform. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1-600.5 (1997) (concerning duties
delegated to the Independent Counsel). Nobody would suggest, however, that
these regulatory delegations of power within the Department create Article
Im adversity between the Attorney General and the Solicitor General, for
example; nor would anybody argue that Congress by allowing such
delegations of authority meant also to allow different components of the
Department to sue one another.
135. Judge Gerhard Gesell so concluded with respect to the firing of
Archibald Cox under the prior version of the regulations. See Nader v. Bork,
366 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C. 1973).
136. See Herz, supra note 70, at 903-06.
137. See id. at 903. The Supreme Court in South Spring Hill Gold Mining
Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U.S. 300 (1892), faced an
analogous situation. One corporation in litigation with another had acquired
its opponent between the circuit court's decision and argument before the
Supreme Court. The attorney representing the plaintiff filed the defendant
corporation's circuit court briefs as well as his own. He explained that the
corporate officers were "anxious" to have the question decided so the minority
shareholders in the acquired corporation would "receive whatever, by the
finding of the court, would be due to them." Id. at 301. The Court
nonetheless dismissed the suit. See id.; see also American Wood Paper Co. v.
Heft, 75 U.S. 333 (1869) (where the complaining company purchased the
patents they were accused of infringing with stock in their own company,
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President and the Attorney General might prefer to litigate
against one another in their official capacities, or (in the
absence of a statute saying otherwise) the President and the
Special Prosecutor might want to, the settled understanding is
that ordinarily they cannot do so, since they are able to resolve
their disputes themselves. In the case of GM, the corporate
law would not permit Chevrolet and Oldsmobile- to litigate
against one another simply by issuing an internal regulation
which said that they could. 138 The same should be true for the
President and those who are charged with aiding him in
executing the criminal laws.
Again relying on the corporate law analogy, the proper
way to look at Accardi and the other cases relied upon in Nixon
is like the situation of an employment contract between GM
and one of its employees. There is nothing problematic about
litigating over such contracts because neither GM nor its
employee has the power conclusively to resolve any disputes
that might arise. So, too, with regulations governing how the
government will treat its employees or other private
individuals.139
Thus, like a hypothetical agreement between Chevrolet
and Oldsmobile to litigate their differences, the situation in
Nixon appears to be a paradigmatic collusive lawsuit. So
weakened was President Nixon by his ill-advised dismissal of
Archibald Cox that his Justice Department issued internal
regulations agreeing not to dismiss Cox's successor absent the
approval of the leaders in both Houses of Congress. 140 In the
case of the Cox firing, however, the uproar was not over the
existence of the power in the President to do what he did; it
there was no longer any adversity between the parties).
138. One reason why a corporation cannot sue itself is to prevent it from
exhausting the claims of shareholders who might later want to bring
derivative actions. See Kane v. Central Am. Mining & Oil, 235 F. Supp. 559,
568 n.36 (1964).
139. Indeed, it is regularly the case that internal department regulations,
while precatory, have no binding effect in court in the sense that an individual
can claim harm if they are violated. See, e.g., U.S. ATT'Y MAN. § 1-1.100
(1997).
140. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693, 694 n.8 (quoting
regulation providing that the President would not "exercise his Constitutional
powers to effect the discharge" of Jaworski except for "extraordinary
improprieties" and "ithout... first consulting the Majority and the Minority
Leaders and Chairmen and ranking Minority Members of the Judiciary
Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives and ascertaining that
their consensus is" that Jaworski should be fired).
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was instead over the abusive nature of the President's exercise
of his power. 141 By the time the situation with Jaworski came
to a head, Nixon had learned that it was far less politically
risky to litigate against his executive branch subordinate than
to direct him to act in a certain way on pain of removal if he
refused to comply. 42 Thus, in Nixon the President chose to
litigate rather than exercise his Article II powers, a choice that
was made legally possible by the issuance of a regulation
essentially saying that the executive branch preferred to
litigate against itself rather than resolve its differences
internally. 43 The regulations worked, then, to give up power
14L Nader v. Bork, the lawsuit over the firing of Cox, was a strange case.
In the first place, Archibald Cox wasn't a plaintiff, and it is charitable to say
that Judge Gesell merely stretched to conclude that the actual plaintiffs had
standing to object to Coxes firing. 366 F. Supp. 104, 105-06 (D.D.C. 1973); cf.
Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2318-22 (1997). Second, Judge Gesell did not
grapple with the question whether Cox's refusal to obey the President's order
not to subpoena further tapes constituted sufficient cause to fire him,
preferring simply to declare a result. See Nader, 366 F. Supp. at 108. In the
end, the case is the purest sort of advisory opinion; Judge Gesell's only order
was to declare the firing of Cox to be illegal. See id. at 109-10. Nobody's legal
status or obligations were an iota different the day after that decision than
they were the day before.
142. Had the President followed such a course (as he did with respect to
Mr. Jaworski's predecessor, Archibald Cox), he would undoubtedly have paid
an enormous political cost-surely to the point of impeachment and likely
conviction. But those political consequences would have had no bearing on
the legality of the President's removal decision. Although such a removal
might technically have been illegal-depending on whether it would have
constituted an extraordinary impropriety to disregard a direct presidential
order to withdraw the subpoena-there would, as a practical matter, have
been no legal consequences of removing Mr. Jaworski, just as was the case
with respect to the removal of Mr. Cox. Cf Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104
(D.D.C. 1973). And in any event no source of law prohibited the President
from demanding that his Attorney General repeal the regulations
guaranteeing Jaworski independence and tenure, and then having him fired.
President Nixon could have accomplished that (assuming the presence of a
willing Attorney General) literally in a moment. That course surely would
have been within the President's power, though it would in all likelihood have
led to his quick impeachment and removal from office.
143. It is important to remember here that Congress had done nothing to
interfere with the President's constitutional authority to fire any of the
executive branch actors involved-whether the Attorney General, or the
Special Prosecutor through the Attorney General. Congress had of course
exerted overwhelming oversight pressure to deter the President from
repeating the Saturday Night Massacre. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 695-96. But
it had done nothing legally effective-that is, it had not passed a law
addressing the issue-on the matter.
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that Congress had lodged in the Attorney General, subject to
the constitutional supervision of the President.
Apart from the cases relied upon in Nixon itself, the
Supreme Court has rarely dealt with litigation between two
executive branch agencies. As I discussed above, the leading
case is United States v. ICC,1' which involved an independent
agency whose commissioners were beyond the direct control of
the President litigating against another executive branch
entity.145 In addition, however, the Court has occasionally
decided an intra-executive dispute without addressing, or even
noting, the potential Article I problems in doing so. In
United States v. Connecticut National Bank146 and United
States v. Marine Bancorporation,147 the Court considered
antitrust challenges by the United States to two separate bank
mergers. Under the applicable regulatory scheme, the banks
were required to seek the approval of the Comptroller of the
Currency, an executive officer who served for a fixed term of
five years but who was subject to removal by the President for
any reason (provided that the President was required to
communicate to the Senate the reason for the dismissal.)148 In
any court challenge to an approved merger, the statutory
scheme gave the Comptroller the right to intervene and defend
the merger.149 In both Connecticut National Bank and Marine
Bancorporation, the challenged mergers had both been
approved by the Comptroller, and he had intervened to defend
both.150 In both cases, the Supreme Court decided the matter
on the merits without mentioning the potential Article III
problem in deciding a case in which the United States (as
144. 337 U.S. 426 (1949).
145. As I discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 73-80, the
Court in ICC dealt with the justiciability challenge by emphasizing that the
real party in interest against the United States Army was not the Interstate
Commerce Commission, but were instead private railroads whose shipping
charges were under challenge. The Court has decided other intra-branch
disputes involving independent agencies which, while nominally parties, were
similarly not the real parties in interest. See FMB v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356
U.S. 481, 483 n.2 (1958); Secretary of Agric. v. United States, 347 U.S. 645,
647 (1954); ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 524 (1944).
146. 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
147. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
148. See 12 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
149. See id. § 1828(c)(7)(D).
150. See Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 614 (noting intervention of
Comptroller); United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240,
242 (D. Conn. 1973) (same), vacated, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
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represented by the Justice Department, which was headed by
an officer removable at will by the President) was the plaintiff,
and the Comptroller of the Currency (who also was removable
essentially at will by the President) was an intervenor-
defendant.
Although at first blush these circumstances seem troubling
to my Article III theory-since they involved parties who were
subject to the President's direction as to how to resolve their
legal differences-upon analysis these cases are troubling
neither as a matter of substance nor precedent. As to
substance, the Court treated the cases just as it had the
dispute in United States v. ICC; the real parties in interest
were the United States (which was challenging the mergers)
and the affected banks (which were seeking to merge). Indeed,
the Court's opinion in neither Connecticut National Bank nor
Marine Bancorporation gives any hint beyond describing what
happened in the courts below that the Comptroller of the
Currency had any interest or involvement at all. There was no
decision on the merits that affected the rights of the United
States in relation to the Comptroller and vice versa. Thus, just
as the Interstate Commerce Commission was not a real party
in interest in United States v. ICC, the Comptroller of the
Currency was not in the subsequent cases.
The situation in the bank merger cases was different from
Nixon in an additional critical respect. Whereas in Nixon the
provision of law putatively creating adversity within the
executive branch was an internal regulation that was subject
to repeal at any time, the provision of law at issue in
Connecticut National Bank and Marine Bancorporation was a
statute passed by Congress which plainly authorized the
lineup of the parties that occurred. Thus the parties in the
bank case were litigating pursuant to specific congressional
authorization rather than by their own agreement. Thus, if a
court were not persuaded that the lack of genuine litigation
between the Comptroller and the Attorney General mitigated
any Article III concerns, it might well be that the statutory
authorization of suits between the United States and the
Comptroller of the Currency is not constitutionally permissible.
In such circumstances, the proper course in a case raising the
issue would be to invalidate the statute as applied. 151
151. The statute is questionable only as applied to suits involving the
United States as the plaintiff challenging a merger. The language in the
[Vol. 83:11971230
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Neither Connecticut National Bank nor Marine
Bancorporation, however, can fairly be treated as precedent
upholding Article H jurisdiction in these circumstances. The
Court did not so much as advert to the problem in either case,
much less analyze it and hold that it was permissible for the
executive branch to litigate against itself. Since at least 1805,
the Court has adhered to the rule that exercises of jurisdiction
that are not challenged and do not result in a holding that
jurisdiction actually exists are not precedential. 152 And it
might well be that were the Court confronted with the issue it
would hold that the statutory authorization of suit in these
circumstances could not be sustained.
Thus it seems as though the Supreme Court's holding in
United States v. Nixon is unique in holding that it is
permissible under Article H to litigate in federal court a
genuine dispute between two executive branch officials whose
dispute was subject to final and authoritative resolution within
the branch. That decision made practical sense in the context
of dealing with the acute political crisis of Watergate. By
forcing the public disclosure of highly incriminating tapes, the
Court's decision led directly to the President's resignation, a
resolution of the crisis that was surely quicker and less
traumatic than would have been impeachment and a Senate
trial. The system paid a cost, however, for resolving the
dispute between Nixon and Jaworski in the courts rather than
in the political arena. Allowing the President (through the
Attorney General) to give up the power to resolve intra-
executive disputes internally necessarily-indeed, by design-
also allows the President to avoid the responsibility and
accountability for how the law is executed.
Although it was surely convenient to all the parties in
Nixon to resolve the matter judicially, that convenience was at
odds with the Court's insistence, particularly in recent years,
statute under which the Comptroller of the Currency intervened was general
in nature, providing a right of intervention in "any action" brought to
challenge certain mergers. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(D). In challenges involving
non-governmental plaintiffs, of course, no issue of intra-branch litigation
would be posed.
152. See, e.g., United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 38
(1952) (noting that the Court is not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction
"where it was not questioned and it was passed sub silentio"); United States v.
More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.) ("No question was
made in that case as to the jurisdiction. It passed sub silentio, and the court
does not consider itself as bound by that case.").
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that the structural commands of the separation of powers
cannot be compromised by agreement or for the convenience of
the parties.153 Unless Article III's demands are qualitatively
different from the demands of the separation of powers in other
contexts, the conclusion seems clear that the decision in Nixon
erred in allowing the parties to resolve their differences
through litigation instead of insisting that they do so among
themselves. In short, where the political stakes could hardly
have been higher, the President and Attorney General were
able to avoid the difficult decision whether to direct Jaworski
not to proceed by essentially asking the courts to decide for
them. As Professor Gunther has argued, that court-centered
resolution of the problem was not necessarily politically
healthy for the Republic.' 54 And as I will argue in more detail
in Part III, the events during the course of the Lewinsky
investigation are part of the wages of Nixon's court-centered
decision relieving the political branches of primary
responsibility for resolving such crises.
3. The "Unique Circumstances" of the Watergate
Investigation and the True Adversity Between Nixon and
Jaworski
The final factor relied upon by the Nixon Court was the
extraordinary factual circumstances that produced the
litigation. The President of the United States was under
serious criminal investigation, and indeed had been named an
unindicted co-conspirator in the very prosecution for which the
tapes had been subpoenaed; the House Judiciary Committee
was in the process of approving articles of impeachment. 155
The Court had granted certiorari before judgment to resolve
the dispute over the tapes as quickly and finally as possible.1 56
After assuring itself that the parties before the Court-the
President and the Special Prosecutor-had real and concrete
differences between them over a question of law, 57 the Court
stated that "[i]n light of the uniqueness of the setting in which
153. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992);
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-27 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
944-46 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-43 (1976) (per curiam).
154 See Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy:
The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L. REv. 30 (1974).
155. See HARRIGER, supra note 82, at 17-20.
156. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 686.
157. See id. at 696-97.
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the conflict arises" the intra-branch nature of the dispute did
not pose a barrier to its justiciability.158
It seems plain that concreteness and adversariness by
themselves are insufficient to provide Article III adversity. As
Professor Herz has noted, mere disagreement between two
parties cannot be sufficient to create adversity; there must be
"situational adversity."15 9  Virtually all the Article III
doctrines, from standing160 to mootness, 161 insist that the
disagreement between the parties be more than concrete and
heartfelt; the law insists, as Professor Herz put it, that
"judicial involvement" is restricted to "circumstances that
require resolution by an outsider."16 2
What this means is that in order to determine whether two
parties are legally adverse-no matter how dramatic the
circumstances and how deep their disagreement-it is
necessary to refer to the substantive law. To return to the
corporate analogy, there is no reason why the law could not
provide that one division of a corporation can sue another; as
the law presently stands, however, that is not possible because
the law lodges in senior officers of a corporation the
responsibility for resolving intra-corporate disputes.163 In the
circumstances of Nixon, if the law is that the President had the
authority, through the Attorney General, to accomplish the
result he was seeking without going to court, that suggests
strongly that the requisite legal adversity did not exist. The
Nixon Court thought that the extant regulations posed a legal
barrier to the President's lawfully accomplishing his objectives.
Although there is a strong case to be made that the Court was
wrong in that view, that ought not to obscure the fact that
neither in Nixon nor anywhere else has the Court suggested
that strong disagreement, standing alone without some basis
in law, is enough to create an Article III case.
158. Id. at 697.
159. Herz, supra note 70, at 902-06.
160. See, e.g., Lujanv. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62 (1992).
161. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316-20 (1974) (per
curiam).
162. Herz, supra note 70, at 904.
163. See South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold
Mining Co., 145 U.S. 300, 300-01 (1892).
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4. Summary
The more one unpacks the Nixon justiciability holding, the
less confident one becomes of its correctness. The key to
agreeing that the Court was right in finding the case to be
justiciable is whether the Attorney General's regulations in
fact posed a legal barrier to the dispute between Nixon and
Jaworski being conclusively resolved without repairing to
court. On the Court's account, the regulations-which
guaranteed Jaworski independence and tenure-were legally
binding. That account is difficult to square, however, with the
fact that the Attorney General is generally given statutory
authority to prosecute crimes and to delegate that authority to
her subordinates, yet the President still retains control because
he has the power to remove the Attorney General if he is
dissatisfied with the way the law is being executed. It is odd
for that Presidential control to be nullified by the unilateral
action of his or her subordinate, and odder still for the
Attorney General to create Article M adversity by the issuance
of a regulation that she is entitled to repeal at any moment for
any reason.
C. ARTICLE I AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
The previously identified problems in finding legal
adversity in Nixon all depended on the intra-executive and
discretionary nature of the sources of law that were said to
create the adversity-that is, the regulations that the Attorney
General issued of his own accord without any demand in law
that he do so. In the wake of Watergate, however, Congress
was not content to leave the problem of investigating and
prosecuting possible crimes by high level officials entirely to
the Justice Department's regulatory solution. Instead,
Congress passed the Ethics in Government Act 64 to formalize
and cement into law the institution of the special prosecutor
(now known as the independent counsel). Much has been
written about the Act and how it operates, and in the interest
of avoiding repetition, I will keep a narrow focus here on the
Article IlI implications of the Act. The fundamental question
164. For the legislative events, see supra note 2. For helpful descriptions
of the Act, see The Independent Counsel Statute: A Symposium, supra note 7;
O'Sullivan, supra note 7; Katy J. Harriger, The History of the Independent
Counsel Provisions: How the Past Informs the Current Debate, 49 MERCER L.
REV. 489 (1998).
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is whether the Act cured any Article I problems inherent in
the regulatory regime. I argue that it did.
1. The Ethics in Government Act's Creation of Legal
Adversity
The Act transfers to the independent counsel virtually 65
complete control over "all investigative and prosecutorial
functions and powers of the Department of Justice [and] the
Attorney General"166 of the matters within his or her
jurisdiction. That broad grant of authority carries with it
complete control over all aspects of investigating and
prosecuting crimes "in the name of the United States."167 The
statute specifically authorizes the independent counsel to
"determin[e] whether to contest the assertion of any
testimonial privilege." 68 And it bars the Justice Department
from taking any further investigative or prosecutorial action
with respect to the matters under investigation.1 69
The statute places the independent counsel within the
control of the Justice Department in two ways. The first, and
less significant way, 70 is that it requires the independent
counsel to "comply with the written or other established
policies of the Department of Justice respecting enforcement of
the criminal laws," subject to the proviso that the independent
counsel is released from that obligation if meeting it would be
inconsistent with the purposes of the Act.17 1 Second, the Act
provides that the Attorney General may remove an
independent counsel only by her "personal action," and only for
"good cause" and other specified reasons relating to incapacity
of the independent counsel 17 2 The statute does not define what
constitutes good cause.
165. The qualifier is necessary because Congress continued to insist in the
Act that the Attorney General be involved in the approval of certain wiretaps.
See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994).
166. Id.
167. Id- § 594(a)(9).
168. Id. § 594(a)(5).
169. See id. § 597(a).
170. Less significant, I should say, for purposes of my argument here. In
the real world functioning of an independent counsel investigation, the
statutory command that the independent counsel follow (where possible)
Justice Department policies undoubtedly has a substantial practical effect.
171. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f)(1).
172. Id. § 596(a)(1). In addition to the good cause removal provision, the
statute provides that an independent counsel may also be removed if he or she
12351999]
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In light of these statutory provisions and the Watergate
history that gave rise to them173 it is not surprising that the
question of legal adversity between independent counsels and
other components of the executive branch-particularly the
President and Attorney General-has not been questioned. It
seems clear that the requisites of an Article I case were
present in each instance of such litigation since the Ethics in
Government Act was passed 20 years ago. In each
circumstance there was genuine and concrete adversity over
legal questions, and Congress by statute had removed the
authority of the Attorney General or President to resolve the
claim outside the courts. Under the Act, it is as though the
corporate law of a state were amended to allow Chevrolet to
sue Oldsmobile. On its face, the Act creates legal
arrangements that provide Article III adversity.
2. Sources of Doubt About the Ethics in Government Act's
Creation of Article III Diversity
There are, however, a couple of wrinkles to consider, one
general and the other particular, which might call into
question the apparently easy conclusion that the Act creates
Article III adversity. The first wrinkle relates to the Attorney
General's power to remove the independent counsel for good
cause. Is it not true, as the Court has insisted, 7 4 that the
power to remove is the power to control, and thus that the
Attorney General (and therefore the President) in fact does
have the power to direct the independent counsel in a manner
that can avoid the necessity of resorting to an Article IlI
forum? Although this point is troubling, it seems to me
ultimately that Congress's action in making the independent
counsel explicitly beyond presidential control and authorized to
litigate such disputes in court is sufficient to create adversity
in any event.
A strong view of the unitary executive might suggest that
the refusal to obey an order from the President as to how to
conduct an investigation-such as the order from Nixon to Cox
not to subpoena any more tapes from the White House-would
suffers from a physical or mental disability or other condition that
substantially impairs his or her job performance. See id.
173. See HARRIGER, supra note 82, at 49-74.
174. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986); Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 134-35 (1926); see also Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S.
349, 352 (1958).
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ipso facto constitute good cause for removal. 175 Under the
theory of Myers v. United States and Justice Scalia's dissent in
Morrison, Article H's grant of the executive power in the
President requires him to be able to remove any officer whose
role is exclusively to aid in the execution of the laws.176 And
175. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV.
41. For an argument suggesting that good cause removal provisions should,
as a matter of statutory interpretation, be read as allowing the President a
large measure of control over independent agencies (including the
independent counsel), see Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 114, at 113-14. In
the context of the Act, such an interpretation would surely be unfaithful to the
understanding of those in Congress who drafted and passed the law.
Professor Manning has offered a creative and careful argument to the
contrary. He argues that the Ethics in Government Act should be read to
allow the President (through the Attorney General) to insist that an
independent counsel follow his litigation orders, and to dismiss the
independent counsel for good cause should his or her orders be defied. See
generally Manning, supra note 117. Professor Manning argues that the
statute will bear such a reading, and that such a reading will save the Court
from having to decide the extraordinarily difficult constitutional question
whether it would violate Article IH to apply the statute to bar a President from
dismissing an independent counsel who defies his or her litigation orders.
While Professor Manning's argument has much appeal, I don't believe
that he ultimately offers a permissible interpretation of the statute. In the
end it is hard to imagine-as his argument requires us to accept-that the
Congress which enacted the Ethics in Government Act would have thought it
conceivable that it remained lawful for the President (or Attorney General) to
dismiss an independent counsel in circumstances identical to those that
resulted in the firing of Archibald Cox. Recall that the disagreement between
Cox and President Nixon was over the paradigm case that is the subject of
Professor Manning's argument-i.e., a direct order from the President to an
inferior officer regarding litigation and investigation strategy. Although I
share Professor Manning's view that it is risky business to ascribe specific
intentions to Congress when it uses general language, it seems that this is the
rare instance in which we can be confident that there would have been virtual
unanimity in Congress (and the political community generally) that the
statutory language chosen would not have permitted the lawful firing of an
independent counsel who defied the President in such circumstances.
Thus, if litigation circumstances raised the question, I do not believe that
it would be proper for a court to interpret the statute in the manner Professor
Manning suggests, even if doing so would avoid the difficult constitutional
question whether it would violate Article 11 to limit the President's removal
authority over an independent counsel who refused to follow the President's
litigation orders. (In fact, such a court would not be avoiding deciding a
constitutional question at all; on Professor Manning's theory the court would
still have to determine whether Article HI adversity existed between the
President and the independent counsel, which is, of course, also a
constitutional question.) Whether or not Article II would be violated in such
circumstances, it remains true that Congress succeeded in the statute in
creating Article HI adversity.
176. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 723-27 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
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there is no disputing that the investigation and prosecution of
crimes is quintessentially the execution of the laws. 17 7 Under a
strong view of the unitary executive, it follows that good cause
removal provisions cannot constitutionally bar the President
from directing the activities of an officer like the independent
counsel.178 As an original matter that might well be the best
way to reconcile the demands of Article H with the law as
enacted by Congress. 179
The implications of this theory are significant, however, as
they call into question the legitimacy of much of the
administrative state. 80 More to the present point, this theory
is also antithetical to the entire point of the Ethics in
Government Act, which was to prevent the President (and the
Attorney General) from having any control over the
prosecutorial decisions of the independent counsel.181 That
dissenting); Myers, 272 U.S. at 127.
177. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691; Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832
(1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-41 (1976) (per curiam). The degree
to which Article H requires that criminal law enforcement be entirely within
the control of the President is a contested question. Compare Steven G.
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 658-61 (1994), with Lessig & Sunstein, supra note
114, at 17-20. See also Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law
Enforcement, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275 (1989).
178. It is an understatement to say that the literature on the implications
and demands of the Constitution's grant of executive power to a single
President of the United States has been voluminous. For a helpful collection
of sources, see Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary
Executive During the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1453-
56 & nn.3-20 (1997).
179. See id; see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 177; Steven G.
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1155 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, The
Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REv. 225;
Miller, supra note 175; Henry Paul Monaghan, The Protective Power of the
Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1993); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note,
Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President's
Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991 (1993). For powerful criticisms of
the notion of a strongly unitary executive, see Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note
114; Cass R. Sunstein, Article 11 Revisionism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 131 (1993).
180. Again, there is a vast literature on these questions, and I am not
prepared to offer a general treatment of the problem at this point. See supra
note 160.
181. See HARRIGER, supra note 82, at 20; Carl Levin, The Independent
Counsel Statute: A Matter of Public Confidence and Constitutional Balance, 16
HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 (1987); Peter J. Rodino, Jr., The Case for the Independent
Counsel, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 5 (1994); see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 706
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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purpose was generally understood to be the impetus for the Act
in the first place; it is manifest on the face of the Act; it was the
clear understanding of multiple Congresses; 182 and has been
recognized as such by multiple courts.1 83 In fact, in addition to
insulating the independent counsel from removal by the
President, the Act specifically contemplates that the
independent counsel will litigate privilege disputes in federal
court.18 4 In light of the historical antecedents of the Act, and
the fact that in all likelihood the only persons whom the
independent counsel will be litigating against are government
employees, Congress must have understood the statutory
authorization of privilege litigation to include litigation against
the President himself. Indeed, interpreting the Act otherwise
would ascribe to Congress the intent to narrow the authority of
the statutory special prosecutor in comparison to the power
that the regulatory Watergate Special Prosecutor had wielded
in the Nixon litigation itself.18 5 Finally, in addition to being
inconsistent with the Ethics in Government Act, the argument
that it constitutes good cause for removal if an independent
counsel refuses to obey a presidential order as to how to
conduct an investigation is also inconsistent with the core of
the Court's removal cases since at least the time of Humphrey's
Executor v. United States.186
Consider Morrison v. Olson itself. In that case, the Court
rejected the notion that Article II required the President to be
able to direct the activities of all inferior officers who aid in the
182. Or at least of the responsible Senate Committees. See, e.g., S. REP.
No. 95-170, at 66 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4282 ("The
whole purpose of [the Act] is defeated if a special prosecutor is not
independent and does not have clear authority to conduct a criminal
investigation and prosecution without interference, supervision or control by
the Department of Justice."); S. REP. No. 97-496, at 15-18 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3551-3554 (same).
183. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695-96; United States v. Wilson, 26
F.3d 142, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1994); In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 504-05 (D.C.
Cir. 1988), rev'd, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
184. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(5) (1994).
185. Indeed, there is a strong argument that the combined effect of the
Act's grant of complete control of litigation in the name of the United States
and the Court's upholding that grant of authority as consistent with Article H
in Morrison is to deny the Attorney General or any other government attorney
standing even to contest the independent counsel's positions in court. See In
re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Silberman, J., concurring in
the denial of rehearing en bane).
186. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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execution of the law. Indeed, the Court was confronted with
that argument by Justice Scalia, and specifically disavowed
any belief that the Constitution required the President to be
able to remove the independent counsel.187 Article IE was not
violated, the Court said, so long as the statutory scheme
established by Congress did not "interfere impermissibly with
[the President's] constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful
execution of the laws."188 Although the doctrinal formulation of
the analysis in Morrison was different from the Court's past
treatment of the removal problem, 189 the underlying idea was
sinilar-that it is permissible for "Congress to regulate the
removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the
officers ... appointed" under law.190 In short, the notion that
the good cause removal provision permits the President to
direct the activities of an independent counsel cannot be
squared with the Ethics in Government Act, nor with the
Court's cases (particularly Morrison) allowing insulation of
inferior officers from presidential control.
That does not mean, of course, that the Court is right. It
does suggest, though, that the President's remedy if he
disagrees with a prosecutorial judgment by an independent
counsel is to remove the latter for cause; that would lead, in all
likelihood, to a court challenge resolving the open question
what exactly does constitute good cause.19' If the President
does not choose to force that confrontation, the status quo thus
would be that the laws enacted by Congress on their face create
legal adversity sufficient to satisfy Article II.
And the Ethics in Government Act creates legal adversity
in a way crucially different from how the Watergate
regulations purported to do so. In order to get his way under
the regulations governing his relationship with Cox and
Jaworski, the President had the option of ordering the
Attorney General to fire the Special Prosecutor for cause. The
President had an additional option available to him as well.
The President also could have ordered the Attorney General to
187. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-92.
188. Id. at 693; see also United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 484 (1886).
189. See, e.g., Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958);
Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 629.
190. Perkins, 116 U.S. at 485 (quoting Perkins v. United States, 20 Ct. C1.
438, 444 (1885)).
191. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692-93 (noting that the question of what
constitutes good cause remains open).
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repeal the regulations-something that could have been done
with the stroke of a pen-and thereby remove any conceivable
legal impediments to the President's accomplishing his
objectives without going to court. Under the Act, by contrast,
although the President might have the power to force a court
fight over the constitutional validity of the good cause removal
provision by dismissing an independent counsel who refuses to
heed his demands, 192 neither the President nor the Attorney
General has the power simply to repeal the good cause removal
provision in the statute. There was nothing in law that
required the Watergate regulations to be kept on the books; in
contrast, the Ethics in Government Act is on the books, and the
President is powerless to dictate otherwise. 193
D. SUMMARY: THE LAW'S CREATION OF ARTICLE I ADVERSITY
In summing up the Article III aspects of the problem of
legal disputes within the executive branch, it is useful to
consider the way the system would work in the absence of legal
provisions-whether statute or regulations-establishing an
independent entity within the executive branch to investigate
and prosecute crimes. Under normal circumstances even the
suggestion that there would be adversity between the Justice
Department and the White House would be viewed as silly.
But first through the Watergate regulations and then through
the Ethics in Government Act, the law has sought to create the
requisite adversity to satisfy Article IlI. In this Part I have
argued that the attempt to create adversity was unsuccessful
with respect to regulations voluntarily issued by the Attorney
General which are subject to repeal at any time. With respect
to the Act, however, the claim of sufficient Article III adversity
is sound. Whether that adversity is consistent with Article H
is the question to which I turn next.
192. It seems clear that the proper course for a court that concluded, in
agreement with Justice Scalia, that the good cause removal provision violated
Article II would be to say so, rather than interpret it to gut the entire point of
the statute as a whole. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995
SUP. CT. REV. 177.
193. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see also Clinton v. City of New York,
118 S. Ct. 2091, 2093 (1998) ("[Tlhere is no constitutional authorization for
the President to amend or repeal [laws].").
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I. ARTICLE 11 AND INTRA-BRANCH LITIGATION
INVOLVING THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
The Article I adversity that the Ethics in Government
Act purchases does not come without a price. In this Part, I
argue that the price extracted by the Act is paid by important
Article HI values. In creating the independence necessary to
allow litigation in Article Ill courts, the Act strikes at the heart
of Article II. At a minimum the developments over the course
of the Lewinsky investigation suggest that the Court in
Morrison v. Olson misjudged in answering the question
"whether the [Act] impede[s] the President's ability to perform
his constitutional duty."19 4
The Article II implications of the Ethics in Government
Act-by which I mean its impact on the role of the President as
Chief Executive-have been the subject of much comment. Of
course, the Supreme Court upheld the Act, over the strong
dissent of Justice Scalia, in Morrison; and the question
whether the Act unconstitutionally intrudes upon the executive
power has been taken to be legally settled ever since.195 Rather
than rehearse prior criticisms of the Act, I will make two
points, using the recent litigation between independent
counsels and other components of the executive branch to
illustrate them. First, even taken on its own doctrinal terms,19 6
194. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691.
195. The position that the Act is unconstitutional has, however, attracted
some prominent academic adherents, among them Professor Amar, see Akhil
Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 802-12 (1999), and
Professor Tribe. Amar and Tribe engaged in a fascinating and illuminating
colloquy on the constitutionality of the Act and the Court's decision in
Morrison in the online journal Slate Magazine (www.slate.com) in September
1998. They agreed that the statute is unconstitutional; Professor Tribe's
position represents a change in his thinking since Morrison, in which he co-
authored an amicus brief for the Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh
supporting the Act's constitutionality. Moreover, the fact that the Act's facial
constitutionality against a separation of powers attack seems judicially settled
does not mean that Morrison's rejection of other attacks on the Act
necessarily are still good law. Subsequent Appointments Clause decisions of
the Court-most particularly, the recent decision in Edmond v. United States,
117 S. Ct. 1573 (1997)-have called into serious question Morrison's
Appointments Clause holding. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-73. For a recent
argument to that effect, see Amar, supra, at 802-12; Bravin, supra note 7; see
also Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 179-80 (1995); Weiss v. United
States, 510 U.S. 163, 169-76 (1994).
196. Here I am taking as a given the controversial proposition that the
separation of powers does not strictly require complete presidential control
over the investigation and prosecution of federal crimes, and that the proper
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the Court in Morrison seriously underestimated the degree to
which the Act imposes on the functioning of the executive
branch. Second, the Act fundamentally disrupts the
constitutional structure by removing accountability from the
President for how the laws are executed. Although these
points might at first seem paradoxical, in fact they are related
and mutually reinforcing.
A. THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT'S PRACTICAL IMPOSITION
ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
The recent litigation between independent counsels and
other components of the executive branch brings into stark
relief the ways in which the Ethics in Government Act disrupts
the normal functioning of the executive branch. The Court's
opinion in Morrison discounted the disruption to the executive
branch caused by the operation of the Act, as well as the
argument that the Act was fatally inconsistent with the
structure of government prescribed by the Constitution. In
this Part, I do not want to rehearse the arguments over
government structure that divided the Court in Morrison.
Instead, I want to focus on the practical consequences of how
the Act operates, and to analyze whether experience under the
Act has justified the Court's confidence in its constitutionality.
1. Government Attorney-Client Privilege
Consider the recent litigation over government attorney-
client privilege. In two rounds of litigation-one in the Eighth
Circuit and one in the D.C. Circuit-Independent Counsel
Starr and the White House litigated the question whether
White House lawyers could claim attorney-client privilege for
advice they rendered to the President and First Lady, as well
as other White House personnel.197 In the Eighth Circuit
analysis is, as was established by Morrison, whether the Act intrudes too
much into the President's ability to fulfill his Article II functions. My
argument thus goes to whether the practical effect of the litigation envisaged
under the Act is intolerably intrusive into the functioning of the executive
branch. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 1513, 1519 (1991); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 114, at 114-16.
197. The White House also claimed that its lawyers' conversations with
individuals and their lawyers outside the government were also covered by
attorney-client privilege, on the theory that in these circumstances the White
House as an institution shared common legal interests with private parties
involved in a criminal investigation. Both the Eighth Circuit, In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
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litigation, the grand jury, at the behest of the independent
counsel investigating in the name of the United States, issued
a subpoena for notes taken by White House lawyers at
meetings with the First Lady. The White House objected to the
subpoena on grounds of attorney-client privilege. The case was
litigated, and ultimately resulted in the Eighth Circuit holding
that there was no privilege for government lawyers vis-a-vis
other government lawyers conducting a grand jury
investigation.9 8 The White House, supported by a Justice
Department amicus curiae brief filed "for the United States,
acting through the Attorney General,"19 9 unsuccessfully sought
certiorari. 200
A similar scenario played itself out in the Lewinsky phase
of Starr's investigation. There, Deputy Counsel to the
President Bruce Lindsey resisted testifying before the grand
jury about any conversations between him and anyone else
(including the President) relating to the Lewinsky situation.
On his behalf, the White House claimed-at the direction of the
President himself201-that Lindsey's conversations were
shielded from disclosure to the grand jury by a government
attorney-client privilege. As he had in the Eighth Circuit,
Independent Counsel Starr refused to accept this argument,
and filed a motion to compel Lindsey's testimony. Thus, the
White House and the independent counsel again were in
litigation over whether evidence held by a public employee in
his or her official capacity was privileged from disclosure to the
public authorities duly charged with the investigation and
prosecution of crime. In the D.C. Circuit litigation the White
House was again supported by an amicus curiae brief filed by
the Attorney General.202 In its decision, the D.C. Circuit
2482 (1997), and the D.C. Circuit, In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998), rejected that argument out of hand.
198. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 915-21.
199. Brief Amicus Curiae for the United States, Acting Through the
Attorney General, Supporting Certiorari, Office of the President v. Office of
Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997) (No. 96-1783).
200. See Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S.
Ct. 2482 (1997).
201. See Declaration of Charles F.C. Ruff 56 (Mar. 17, 1998). Mr. Ruff,
who serves as President Clinton's White House Counsel, filed this declaration
as part of the district court litigation between the independent counsel and
the White House over attorney-client privilege.
202. Brief Amicus Curiae For the United States Acting Through the
Attorney General, In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Nos. 98-3060,
98-3062, 98-3072). The Justice Department-that is, the Attorney General,
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rejected both the Justice Department's and White House's
positions, and agreed completely with the independent
counsel's submission that no government attorney-client
privilege of any sort existed in these circumstances.
20 3
The government attorney-client privilege litigation in the
Eighth and D.C. Circuits raised fundamental issues relating to
the obligations and relationships of government lawyers and
those whom they advise. And the result has been two court of
appeals decisions firmly concluding that a government lawyer
has no business withholding evidence of criminal wrongdoing
by anybody-even the President of the United States.
Regardless of whether one believes these decisions to be
correct-as I do2 4-they are surely important. Given the
ubiquity of attorney-client relationships within the
government, it is striking that these issues had never been
litigated. Despite efforts by both sides to analogize to litigation
that had arisen in other circumstances, there had been
virtually no reported cases in which federal government
lawyers had resisted giving evidence acquired in the course of
their official duties in response to the demands of a federal
criminal investigation.
The reason why that is so is because until the independent
counsel system appeared, these issues were resolved internally
within the executive branch. And outside the context of an
independent counsel investigation, it is today impossible for a
government lawyer to litigate over whether he or she will be
obliged to give evidence in a criminal investigation-that
decision is entirely the Attorney General's to make after
considering the prosecutorial and other interests of the United
States.205 According to the Justice Department, these decisions
who was appointed by the President and serves at his pleasure-did not,
however, fully agree with the broad position of the White House that its
lawyers' conversations were absolutely privileged. See id. at 11. The two
government attorney-client privilege cases were rare-perhaps unique-
situations where the Attorney General, acting in her official capacity
representing the United States, took a legal position contrary to that of the
President of the United States, also acting in his official capacity.
203. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
204. I played a role as a consultant to Independent Counsel Starr in the
D.C. Circuit (and subsequent) litigation over both government attorney-client
privilege and the Secret Service protective function privilege.
205. See Brief Amicus Curiae For the United States Acting Through the
Attorney General at 11-12, Lindsey (Nos. 98-3060, 98-3062, 98-3072); see also
28 U.S.C. §§ 511-12, 516, 533, 547 (1994).
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are made in a two-step process. First, the decision needs to be
made to seek the information from the government lawyer in
the first place, whether he or she is in the Justice Department
itself or another agency within the executive branch. In
deciding whether to seek that information internally, the
Attorney General seeks to accommodate the prosecutorial
interests of the United States with other interests of the
government, including the interests of the involved agency to
encourage full and candid legal representation in the course of
its business. 206 The decision whether to seek the information in
the first place is made by the Attorney General in consultation
with the affected agencies.207 According to the Attorney
General, it would be "rare" for her not to seek from a
government lawyer evidence "directly relating to the
commission of a federal crime;"208 and she would "often"
subsequently decide to use such evidence in a court or grand
jury proceeding notwithstanding its genesis in an attorney-
client relationship.209
The Attorney General emphasizes the institutional
memory, long term stability, and multitude of government
interests that are brought to bear in making these decisions. 210
And once these decision are made-and absent presidential
intervention these are the Attorney General's decisions to
make-that is the end of the matter. There is no room for
litigation about these intra-executive matters in normal
circumstances; indeed, it is the position of the Department of
Justice that such litigation is impossible because there would
206. See Brief Amicus Curiae For the United States Acting Through the
Attorney General at 11-13, Lindsey (Nos. 98-3060, 98-3062, 98-3072).
207. See id. at 12-13. Consistent with executive branch policy generally,
see, e.g., Constitutionality of Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Imposition of
Civil Penalties on the Air Force, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 131, 143 (1989), the
Justice Department noted that an agency which is dissatisfied with the
Attorney General's decision to seek information from its lawyers could seek to
have the President of the United States resolve the matter. See BriefAmicus
Curiae For the United States Acting Through the Attorney General at 13,
Lindsey (Nos. 98-3060, 98-3062, 98-3072).
208. See Brief Amicus Curiae For the United States Acting Through the
Attorney General at 13, Lindsey (Nos. 98-3060, 98-3062, 98-3072).
209. Id. The Attorney General's amicus brief identified no instance in
which the Justice Department had decided not to seek evidence of federal
crimes from a government lawyer on grounds of government attorney-client
privilege, and no instance in which it decided not to introduce such evidence
in a court or grand jury proceeding.
210. See id. at 13-14.
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be no legal adversity between the two executive branch entities
before the court.211
In an independent counsel investigation, however, the
normal operations of the executive branch cannot work. The
independent counsel's charge is to vindicate the investigative
and prosecutorial interests of the United States,212 and that
task calls upon him or her to seek out relevant evidence
wherever it may be. And although the independent counsel
enjoys prosecutorial discretion to decide it is not worthwhile to
pursue certain evidence, that officer lacks the broad
institutional competence of the Attorney General in balancing
prosecutorial and other interests of the United States, the
motive to do so, and, most importantly, the statutory
authorization to take account of those other broad interests.
The Ethics in Government Act seeks to place the
independent counsel in the Attorney General's shoes. It might
follow from that substitution of roles that the proper analysis
of the attorney-client privilege situation was for the White
House lawyers to be subject to the independent counsel's
direction as to how to proceed (as they would be with respect to
the Attorney General absent the presence of an independent
counsel on the scene), with the right to seek the President's
intervention should they and the independent counsel disagree
over whether the evidence should be submitted (as would again
be the case if it were the Attorney General and not an
independent counsel involved).213 This theory of how the Act
operates, however, presents two problems, one practical and
one legal.
The practical point is that the independent counsel simply
lacks the institutional capacity to take account of all the
relevant factors in discharging the Attorney General's role in
this context. The independent counsel simply cannot
completely take on the role of the Attorney General. In the
21L See, e.g., 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 138-43; Resolution of Legal
Dispute Between the Department of Energy and the Tennessee Valley
Authority, 11 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 70, 72 (1987); Proposed Tax Assessment
Against the United States Postal Service, 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 79 (1977).
212. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994).
213. Professor Paulsen makes a similar argument-that the privilege in
this context belongs to the independent counsel and not the White House-on
the basis of an analogy to the common law privilege held by corporations and
not on the basis of the operation of the Ethics in Government Act. See
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's Attorney-Client
Privilege?, 83 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1998).
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related context of the Classified Information Procedure Act
(CIPA), courts have held that, notwithstanding the general
substitution of the independent counsel for the Attorney
General, it remains the Attorney General's prerogative under
section 6(e)214 of that statute to file an affidavit barring
national security information from being used in court.215 That
reading of CIPA is justified by the variety of governmental
interests beyond the prosecutorial interests of the United
States that must be considered in making that judgment.
Indeed, CIPA itself is premised upon the recognition that it is
sometimes appropriate for the government to compromise its
interest in criminal law enforcement because of a more weighty
public interest. An independent counsel, by contrast with the
Attorney General, lacks not only the institutional resources to
make those judgments, but also the legitimacy and
accountability necessary to justify such decisions to the
interested parties. As a practical matter, then, there are
inevitably differences between the operation of an independent
counsel's office and the Justice Department.
The legal objection to reading the Act to place the
independent counsel in the Attorney General's shoes for
purposes of invoking or waiving government attorney-client
privilege is that it places the decision ultimately, but directly,
in the President's hands. But the Ethics in Government Act's
very reason for being is to relieve the independent counsel from
having to follow presidential or Attorney General directives as
to how to investigate, and to shield him or her from removal
except for good cause. The Act thus creates an irreconcilable
conflict between the ability of the executive branch to
function-in the present circumstances, for the institutional
judgments regarding when and how broadly to assert
government attorney-client privilege-and the demand for
independence in federal criminal investigations run by
independent counsels.
The Morrison majority might scoff that this conflict does
not rise to the level of significantly impeding the ability of the
President to execute the laws, and thus does not present any
214. 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(e) (1994).
215. See United States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d 465, 471 (4th Cir. 1989);
United States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1441, 1442 (D.D.C. 1989); see also
Jordan, supra note 18; Noble, supra note 18.
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serious possibility of violating Article II.216 But the tradition of
resolving these matters within the executive branch had a
salutary effect on the functioning of the legal system and of the
executive branch. It is likely that questions of government
attorney-client privilege did not arise much in the past, if only
because the circumstances are rare in which government
lawyers in their official capacities have evidence relevant to a
federal criminal investigation. In this context, the absence of
hard and fast legal rules-like the ones that came out of the
Eighth Circuit and D.C. Circuit-allowed there to be greater
flexibility and discretion in resolving these matters than now is
the case. Moreover, there has been substantial (though, in my
opinion, highly overstated) commentary on the deleterious
effect that the litigation will have on the ability of government
lawyers to provide effective and candid legal advice to their
public clients.217 Finally, the President himself, through his
counsel, has taken the position that the absence of government
attorney-client privilege will substantially affect his and other
public officials' ability to do their jobs.218
In sum, the practical effect of government attorney-client
litigation has been to intrude on the Attorney General's, and
thus the President's, ability to execute the laws.219 That is not
to say that the Eighth Circuit and D.C. Circuit were wrong in
concluding that there was no privilege in this context. On the
216. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-93 (1988).
217. See Stephen Braun & Richard T. Cooper, Sunday Report: Pathway to
Peril: How Clinton and His Adversaries Endangered His Presidency, L.A.
TISs, Jan. 31, 1999, at S4; Tom Teepen, Starr Aims To Handcuff Clinton-
and Others, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 4, 1998, at 6A, Editorial, The Damage
Lingers on, STUART NEws/PORT ST. LucIE NEws, Jan. 18, 1999, at All.
218. See Petition for Certiorari at 19, In Re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
219. My argument here is not that there is a structural imperative that all
aspects of federal criminal law enforcement be within the direct control of the
President. See Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of
Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253, 1319 (1988). That would render it
inconsistent with the Constitution for federal crimes to be prosecuted in state
court. See Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38
HARV. L. REV. 545 (1925). The reasoning of the Court's recent decision in
Printz v. United States, however, suggests that very possibility. 117 S. Ct.
2365, 2378 (1997) (stating that it impinges on the President's Article I1
authority to commandeer state officers to aid in the execution of federal laws).
In any event, my point here is simply to emphasize the stark intrusion on the
normal operations of the executive branch worked by the Act in the context of
litigation between executive entities.
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contrary, I think those decisions were correct.220 My point here
is that by removing these matters from the Attorney General's
(and hence the President's) control-which as an historical
matter was effectively not to recognize any privilege in federal
criminal investigations-the Act diminishes the effective
functioning of the executive branch and its accommodation of
its law enforcement and other functions. The example of
government attorney-client privilege is an example of the
practical ways in which Morrison was misguided.
2. The Secret Service Protective Function Privilege
The litigation between Starr and the Treasury Department
over whether Secret Service agents could be made to testify to
facts they learned during the course of exercising their function
of protecting the President further illustrates the mistake of
Morrison.
The Secret Service strongly objected when the independent
counsel sought to question agents as part of the Lewinsky
investigation. For legal representation, the Secret Service
turned to its regular counsel (as provided by statute221), the
Department of Justice. A series of negotiations ensued
between the Department of Justice and the independent
counsel over the appropriate scope of questioning in light of a
new, common law evidentiary privilege that the Department of
Justice asserted protected the agents from having to testify.
The argument was that the transcendent public good of
protecting the life of the President justified the creation of a
new protective function privilege under Federal Rule of
Evidence 501.222 The Secret Service claimed that, in its expert
judgment, Presidents would inevitably (if unconsciously) push
away their protectors at the cost of their own safety if they
knew that the agents might be called upon to testify some day
in connection with a criminal investigation.223
220. My reasons for thinking so are beyond the scope of this paper. For
academic takes on the matter, see, for example, Roger C. Cramton, The
Lawyer As Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer, 5 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 291 (1991); Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics
in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CE[I. L. REV. 1293 (1987); Paulsen,
supra note 213. See also Douglas R. Cox, Ken Starr, Not Hillary Clinton, Is
the "Client"Here, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1997, at A19.
221. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 512, 514, 516 (1994).
222. FED. R. EVID. 501 (authorizing the federal courts to recognize
privileges by the common law method "in the light of reason and experience").
223. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g en banc denied,
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The independent counsel objected that there was no basis
for the creation of such a strange and new common law
privilege; neither it nor any analogous privilege (say, for the
protectors of state executives) had ever been recognized by any
court or legislature in Anglo-American legal history.224
Moreover, the independent counsel argued that the agents, as
sworn law enforcement officers,225  should welcome the
opportunity to provide testimony about potential federal
crimes. Finally, the independent counsel relied on 28 U.S.C. §
535(b), a federal statute that obligates any employee in the
executive branch who has information relating to federal
crimes to see that it is reported to the Attorney General.226
These factors, the independent counsel argued, made it
impossible to create any "protective function privilege."227
As part of a series of attempts to compromise on the
matter, a number of depositions with limited questioning of
Secret Service agents took place, with the independent counsel
questioning the agents and the Department of Justice
representing them. Ultimately, the matter went to litigation.
First the district court and then the D.C. Circuit (in an opinion
that Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized as "cogent and
correct"228) ruled for the independent counsel and ordered the
agents to testify.29 The Secret Service's petition for a writ of
certiorari, filed on its behalf by the Justice Department, was
later denied.230
146 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
224. See generally Brief of Appellee United States, In re Sealed Case, 148
F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (No. 98-3069).
225. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(c)(1)(C) (1994) (authorizing the Secret Service to
arrest persons who commit, inter alia, "any offense against the United
States"). Section 3056 establishes a dual role for the Secret Service;
subsection (a) charges the Service with protecting the President and certain
others; subsection (c) charges the Service also with traditional law
enforcement functions.
226. In fact, subsection (b)(1) of that statute seems on its face to have
obligated the agents, if they had any information, to report it directly to the
independent counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b)(1) (qualifying the responsibility
to report to the Attorney General if "the responsibility to perform an
investigation... is specifically assigned otherwise by another provision of
law").
227. See generally Brief of Appellee United States, In re Sealed Case, 148
F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
228. Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1, 2 (1998).
229. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing en
bane denied, 146 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998).
230. Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998).
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The saga of the Secret Service's efforts to avoid having its
agents testify, and of the Justice Department's decision that its
client was correct and justified in its view, further illustrates
the dilemma that the Ethics in Government Act creates. On
the one hand, there was an extraordinarily strong national
interest at stake which the Justice Department professed to be
pursuing-seeking to avert the assassination of the President
of the United States. Indeed, it would be an understatement to
describe as merely dramatic the rhetoric employed by the
Secret Service and the Justice Department in describing the
stakes which they claimed to be fighting for.231 On the other
hand, not only did the Act remove from the Attorney General's
control whether the evidence would be sought, the Act in all
likelihood prohibited the Justice Department from
representing the Secret Service in the litigation at all.
The Ethics in Government Act, as I have noted a number
of times, deliberately sought to insulate from presidential and
Attorney General control the prosecutorial decisions of the
independent counsel. With respect to the role of the Justice
Department in litigation, moreover, it goes even further than
guaranteeing independence. First, it places the independent
counsel squarely in the role of Attorney General for purposes of
litigating matters within his or her jurisdiction, including
whether to contest the assertion of testimonial privileges.232
Second, the Act addresses the independent counsel's
relationship with the Department of Justice by specifying that
the Department must provide any assistance that the
231. See Brief for the Department of Justice at 17, In re Sealed Case, 148
F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("IT]he safety of the President poses national
security concerns of the highest order."); id. at 18 ("The success of the Secret
Service is entirely dependent upon the ability of its personnel to maintain
constant proximity to the President."); id. at 19 ("[The Secret Service must be
immediately at hand ... when the sniper's bullet is fired, the bomb explodes
or the aircraft veers unexpectedly toward the White House grounds."); see also
Joint Appendix, Declaration of Lewis Merletti at 5, In re Sealed Case, 148
F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("The assassination of the President of the United
States is, quite literally, a cataclysmic event."); id. at 23 ("Had [President
Reagan] felt the need to push the protective envelope away by as little as a
few feet, world history would have been irrevocably altered."); id. at 25 ("[Ihf
[the protective function privilege was not recognizedi, it would have a
catastrophic effect on the ability of the Secret Service to complete one of its
most important statutory missions-the protection of the life and safety of
foreign dignitaries.").
232. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(5) (1994).
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independent counsel requests,233 and must otherwise cease any
investigation of the matters within the independent counsel's
jurisdiction. 23 4 These provisions-the grant of authority to the
independent counsel and the withdrawal of authority from the
Justice Department-suggest that it is impermissible under
the Act for the Department to litigate against an independent
counsel. That inference is strongly supported, moreover, by 28
U.S.C. § 597(b), which provides that nothing in the statute
prevents the Department from participating in litigation as
amicus curiae. It is hard to see why that provision was
necessary if the Justice Department were generally allowed to
participate in litigation, even by representing a party, as it
sees fit.235
The upshot of this, as Judge Silberman forcefully argued
in concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, is that the
Justice Department had no business representing the Secret
Service in the litigation.236 So long as the diffusion of executive
authority established by the Act and upheld in Morrison
remains the law, he argued, it is up to the independent counsel
to determine whether the Secret Service's claim of privilege
should be recognized. 237
There is much force in Judge Silberman's point. In
particular, it is difficult to square the Attorney General's
representation of the Secret Service with the combined effect of
the Ethics in Government Act's mandate that the independent
counsel will litigate in the name of the United States and the
Supreme Court's rejection of the idea in United States v.
Providence Journal Co. 238 that there could be more than one
233. See id. § 594(d)(1).
234. See id. § 597(a). In addition to providing the assistance contemplated
in section 594(d)(1), the Justice Department may also continue to play a role if
the independent counsel agrees in writing to permit continued Department
involvement. See id
235. To be sure, the Justice Department is charged in general terms with
representing federal agencies, including the Department of the Treasury and
the Secret Service, in their litigation. See id. § 516. It would be strange,
however, to construe a general provision such as section 516 as governing over
the specific strictures of the Ethics in Government Act. See, e.g., Mail Order
Ass'n of Am. v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 515-17 (D.C. Cir.
1993); see also United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255, 260 (1890).
236. See In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Silberman, J.,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
237. See id.
238. 485 U.S. 693 (1988).
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litigating entity called the United States.239 Moreover, it is
hard to see how the Justice Department can be discharging its
obligation to aid an independent counsel if it is representing an
opposing party in litigation. On the contrary, it seems clear
that the Act's allowance of amicus curiae participation by the
Justice Department reflected a necessary expression of an
exception from the statute's otherwise disabling of the
Department from participating in litigation involving an
independent counsel.
But the argument pressed by Judge Silberman that the
Justice Department lacked standing-in the sense that it could
not be a party to the litigation-both proves too much and is
somewhat beside the point.240 As a formal matter, the Justice
Department was representing the Treasury Department and
not the United States, while the independent counsel was
representing the United States. Although that distinction
might well seem entirely formal-after all, it is one
government-in fact the distinction is one that has been
consistently recognized in law. If it were otherwise, no intra-
government litigation of any sort would be within the Article
III powers of the federal courts; it would follow, for example,
that litigation between the President and the statutory
independent counsel over executive privilege or any other
government privilege is impossible (contrary to United States
v. Nixon241 and United States v. ICC, to name just two cases.)
It would also seem that the argument would deprive inter-
branch disputes of their Article III character; after all, as the
239. Although the Providence Journal Court indeed pronounced as
"startling" the notion that the "United States" might consist of different
litigating entities, id. at 701, the Court went on to recognize that Congress
had effectively required something like that in the Ethics in Government Act,
see id. at 705 n.9. The Court decided Providence Journal the same term as
Morrison v. Olson.
240. It is worth noting that Judge Silberman's standing argument was
based on that doctrine's prudential aspects, rather than on Article HI itself.
His argument was that Congress had removed standing on the Attorney
General's part. See In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(Silberman, J., concurring).
241. Although I have argued that Nixon got its justiciability holding
wrong, I have not claimed that two government entities can never litigate over
privileges; my argument was just that for purposes of Article I the law has
to construct their legal relationships in a way that prevents one from ordering
the other to relent.
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Court stated in Nixon, in a certain sense, the "United States" is
a single entity made up of all three branches of government. 242
For Article III purposes, the better way to consider
whether the parties could properly litigate against one another
is again whether one of them, or an officer superior to them,
has the authority in law to dictate the outcome without
resorting to court. On that analysis, there surely was adversity
between the independent counsel and the Secret Service,
because the Act removes from the Attorney General's (and
President's) control the decision whether the evidence would be
sought.243
That is not to say, however, that the Act did not deprive
the Attorney General of the power to represent the Secret
Service. As I have argued, it is hard to construe the statute
otherwise. It does not follow, however, that the Secret Service
was bound simply to comply with the independent counsel's
demands. On the contrary, the authority granted by the Act to
the independent counsel is limited to investigating and
prosecuting crimes (and the functions appurtenant to that);
that authority does not reach so far as to include directing the
policy decisions of the Secret Service regarding how to balance
its protective and law enforcement functions.2" In providing
that an independent counsel is bound to follow Justice
Department policy wherever possible, the Act indicates that
the independent counsel's role, although it is assuredly quite
broad, is not to make such important and broad policy
decisions for the government.
Consider, then, the impact of the Act on the functioning of
the executive branch in the context of the Secret Service
controversy. The Act deprived the Attorney General of her
242. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974).
243. Of course, the President had the constitutional authority to order the
Secret Service to testify, and nothing in any statute purported to say
otherwise. But the fact that the President is able conclusively to resolve the
dispute in one direction cannot deprive the case of its adversity.
244. Since the Justice Department was deprived of authority to litigate on
the Secret Service's behalf, the proper course would have been for the Service
to hire private counsel, which was the course that the White House followed
in its litigation against the independent counsel. Indeed, if it was proper for
the Justice Department to represent the Secret Service, then it would have
been proper for it to represent the White House. There is no analytical
distinction between the situations; the only difference is the possible
perception that the Justice Department has a greater conflict of interest in
representing the White House versus another cabinet agency.
1999] 1255
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
authority to direct whether evidence would be sought in a
criminal proceeding, in a context where her court statements
indicated that she believed that the life of the President was
literally on the line if the independent counsel got his way.
What is more, the Act also deprived the Justice Department of
its traditional authority, indeed responsibility, to represent its
client agencies in court against the independent counsel.2 45
Thus was the fuictioning of the executive branch impeded by
the Act.
At a basic level, that imposition caused the Secret Service
to believe that its mission of protecting the President had been
severely undermined. The Secret Service claims that its
agents were demoralized by being forced to "violate[ I a code of
confidentiality and trust" in a way that "adversely affected" its
"morale and its ability to do its mission."246 The stakes could
hardly be higher, of course, than when the life of the President
is endangered. But the Act removed any officer in the
executive branch except the independent counsel himself from
having any lawful influence over the determination whether
the evidence would be sought.247
Although no one can say how the loose balancing analysis
of Morrison-which inquires into whether the functioning of
the independent counsel statute "impede[s] the President's
ability to perform his constitutional duty"24 8-might apply in
this context, there is a good argument that the arrangement
violates Article H even under Morrison. It is entirely possible
that the Court would agree that the practical insulation of the
independent counsel, as well as his or her lack of institutional
capacity to fully appreciate the factors at stake, result in a
situation where the President's ability to execute the law is
245. The same analysis would apply to the Justice Department's opposition
in court to Independent Counsel Smaltz's attempts to expand his jurisdiction.
See In re Espy, 145 F.3d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Espy, 80 F.3d 501 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
246. Letter from Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. to
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr (Aug. 3, 1998), reprinted in H.R. Doc.
No. 105-311, Pt. 2, at 2441-42 (1998).
247. I don't mean to suggest either that the independent counsel made the
wrong judgment, or that the courts were not correct in refusing to create the
asserted privilege. On the contrary, I believe both those judgments were
correct, and clearly so. That does not mean, however, that the structural and
practical insulation of that decision from the executive branch is not a
harmful thing. My objection is to the fact that the decision was Starr's alone,
not to the way in which he made it.
248. Morrisonv. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1987).
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unconstitutionally diminished. And that possibility is made
more plausible by the nature of the potential consequences if
the wrong judgments are made. But we can say at the very
least that the practical impact of removing the Attorney
General from the equation makes it substantially more difficult
for the executive branch to discharge its functions.
In addition, the litigation over the Secret Service's
attempts to establish a protective function privilege starkly
illustrates the Morrison Court's perversion of the
Appointments Clause.249 The Appointments Clause requires
that "Officers of the United States" be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate; but it also
provides that for the category of "inferior Officers," Congress
can lodge the appointment in "the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." 250 Since the
Act lodges the appointment of the independent counsel in the
Special Division, and thus bypasses both the President and the
Senate in the process, its constitutionality under the
Appointments Clause depended upon a finding that the
independent counsel is an inferior officer.251
The Court in Morrison so held, concluding that the
independent counsel is an inferior officer of the United States,
and thus that it was within Congress's power to lodge her
appointment in a court of law rather than in presidential
appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate.252 The
Court relied upon a variety of factors to support that
conclusion, including the limited scope of jurisdiction and
functions, as well as tenure in office, of the independent
counsel.253 But the factor that I want to focus on here is the
Court's conclusion that the good cause removal provision was
sufficient to make the independent counsel inferior to the
Attorney General. 254  The Court acknowledged that the
independent counsel functioned independently of the Attorney
249. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
250. Id.
251. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-37 (1976) (per curiam) (holding
that the Appointments Clause provides the exclusive method for appointing
officers of the United States).
252. 487 U.S. at 670-73.
253. See id. at 671-72.
254. See id. at 671.
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General, but claimed that the removal provision "indicates that
she is to some degree 'inferior' in rank and authority."
255
Justice Scalia objected to this analysis, claiming that
inferiority in rank was insufficient to establish inferiority for
purposes of the Appointments Clause.256 As I noted above, the
Court's subsequent cases provide a strong basis for thinking
that Morrison's Appointments Clause analysis is no longer
good law.257 In particular, the Appointments Clause analysis of
the Court in Edmond v. United States258-which was written
by Justice Scalia and joined by seven other Justices 259-
concluded that certain military judges were inferior officers
because their work was subject to supervision and direction by
a principal officer.260 Although the Court did not purport to
call Morrison into question, its analysis plainly was
inconsistent with the Court's treatment of the independent
counsel:
It is not enough that other officers may be identified who formally
maintain a higher rank or possess responsibilities of a greater
magnitude.... Rather, in the context of a clause designed to preserve
political accountability relative to important government
assignments, we think it evident that "inferior officers" are officers
whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others who
were appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and
consent of the Senate.ul
However one describes the functioning of the independent
counsel, it cannot be said that the independent counsel works
at the direction and control of any principal officer. That
reality is illustrated in concrete terms by the litigation between
Starr's office and the Secret Service. As indicated by the
Justice Department's representation of the Secret Service, it
appears to be the Attorney General's policy that evidence in
criminal proceedings will not be sought from Secret Service
255. Id.
256. See id. at 715-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. See sources cited supra note 195.
258. 117 S. Ct. 1573 (1997).
259. See id. at 1582-83 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (noting the tension between Edmond and the Morrison Court's
treatment of the Appointments Clause).
260. For the appointment of the officers in question to be constitutional, it
was necessary that they be inferior officers, since they had been appointed by
the Secretary of Transportation, a "Head[ ] of Department[ I" in Appointments
Clause terms. U.S. CONST. art H, § 2, cl. 2.
26L Edmond, 117 S. Ct. at 1580-81.
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agents.262 Moreover, exercising authority granted to her by
law,263 the Attorney General exempted the Secret Service from
the otherwise applicable statutory obligation to report evidence
of crimes that they acquire in the course of their duties.264
Thus, all officers of the executive branch-with the exception of
the independent counsel-are directed as a matter of policy not
to compel Secret Service agents to provide testimony about
information they learned in the course of discharging their
duty to protect the President.265 By exempting the independent
counsel from any supervision-the implications of which are
illustrated by the Secret Service situation-the Ethics in
Government Act effectively places the independent counsel in a
superior position to the only principal officer who can arguably
be said to supervise and direct his or her conduct.266
262. See Brief for the Department of Justice at 25, In re Sealed Case, 148
F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[The President's willingness to tolerate
continuous proximity will be impaired by the knowledge that Secret Service
personnel can be subject to grand jury subpoenas.").
263. See 28 U.S.C. § 535(b)(2) (1994) (exempting agencies and departments
from the statutory duty to report evidence of crimes acquired during the
course of business if "the Attorney General directs otherwise with respect to a
specified class of information, allegation, or complaint").
264. See Brief for the Department of Justice at 35, In re Sealed Case, 148
F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("[Hlere, the Attorney General has specifically
determined that the privilege should be asserted.").
265. The Attorney General never purported to direct Independent Counsel
Starr not to seek evidence from the Secret Service, and thus the question
whether he was bound by the Attorney General's decision to invoke her
section 535(b)(2) authority never arose.
If the Attorney General had purported to direct the independent counsel
not to seek the evidence, the question would have become whether it would be
"inconsistent with the purposes" of the Ethics in Government Act for the
independent counsel to "comply with the.., policies of the Department of
Justice" with respect to the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f)(1).
266. In an illuminating article, Professor Barrett noted the various ways in
which, notwithstanding the statutory grant of autonomy to the independent
counsel, the Justice Department effectively impedes the independent counsel's
ability to perform his or her assigned tasks. See Barrett, supra note 16, at
531-41. Professor Barrett views these sources of interference as impeding the
goals of the Act; for example, the Attorney General's refusal to allow certain
classified information to be introduced under CIPA caused Independent
Counsel Lawrence Walsh to dismiss one indictment entirely and parts of
another. See id. at 536-37. To remedy this interference, Professor Barrett
proposes a variety of measures to make clear the authority of the independent
counsel over even the Attorney General in matters within his or her
jurisdiction. See id. at 541-42. Whatever one thinks as a policy matter of
Professor Barrett's argument, adoption of the measures he suggests would
make clearer still the insuperable Appointments Clause difficulties associated
with an independent counsel who is superior in office even to the Attorney
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3. Intra-branch Litigation in the Absence of the Ethics in
Government Act
It is helpful in thinking about the impact of the Ethics in
Government Act on the operations of the executive branch to
consider how things would work if the statute did not exist. As
discussed above, disputes within the executive branch over the
investigation and prosecution of crimes are generally resolved
conclusively by the Attorney General, subject to presidential
review if the losing agency insists. The Justice Department
recently represented in court that the normal practice is for
these decisions to be made by the Attorney General in
consultation with the affected agencies.267 That method of
resolving matters is reflected in applicable executive orders 268
and Office of Legal Counsel precedents,269 which generally call
upon executive agencies to submit their legal disputes to the
Attorney General for her resolution.27 0
Notably, however, the applicable executive precedents
treat differently disputes between agencies whose heads serve
at the pleasure of the President and disputes involving
independent agencies. Thus, if an independent agency is
involved-which means that Congress has removed from the
President (and thus the Attorney General) the power to direct
the resolution of the dispute-the parties are encouraged to
submit the matter to the Attorney General.27 If, however, both
disputants are subject to removal at the pleasure of the
President, then the executive order insists that the Attorney
General resolve the matter.272
What that means is that outside the independent counsel
context, it is impossible for two executive agencies to litigate
General and who is nonetheless appointed without the check provided by
presidential appointment and senatorial advice and consent.
267. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae For the United States Acting
Through the Attorney General, In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(Nos. 98-3060, 98-3062, 98-3072).
268. See Exec. Order No. 12146, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1979).
269. See, e.g., Constitutionality of Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
Imposition of Civil Penalties on the Air Force, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 131,
138-43 (1989); Resolution of Legal Dispute Between the Department of
Energy and the Tennessee Valley Authority, 11 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 70
(1987); Proposed Tax Assessment Against the United States Postal Service, 1
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 79 (1977).
270. See Exec. Order No. 12146, 3 C.F.R. 411 (1979).
271. See id.
272. See id.
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against one another.2 3 Because disputes are resolved within
the executive branch, there is no occasion for such litigation
legitimately to arise. And although litigation involving
independent agencies has arisen with some frequency,274 the
Supreme Court has never decided a case between two executive
agencies. The closest it has come to doing that is United States
v. Nixon, a decision which I have argued above was
mistaken.2 5 Thus, outside the independent counsel context
there are no reported instances of litigation between two
components of the executive branch over executive privilege, or
government attorney-client privilege, or certainly over a
protective function privilege.
Of course, one might reasonably wonder how it could be
otherwise. After all, the executive branch has no occasion to
call on itself for evidence outside the context of criminal
prosecutions; and under our current practice and long tradition
criminal prosecutions are quintessentially within the control of
the Attorney General. But not when an independent counsel is
on the scene. Consider, for example, the multiple disputes
between Independent Counsel Smaltz and the Attorney
General about the scope of the Espy investigation. 27 6 On two
occasions the courts were called upon to resolve who had the
273. The Office of Legal Counsel has taken the broad position that inter-
agency litigation is impermissible even with respect to independent agencies.
See 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 131, 138-39 (1989); Resolution of Legal Dispute
Between the Department of Energy and the Tennessee Valley Authority, 11
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 70 (1987). The applicable executive order, however,
recognizes the distinction between executive and independent agencies in this
context, see Exec. Order No. 12146, 3 C.F.R. 411 (1979); and the Supreme
Court effectively has as well. See, e.g., Secretary of Agric. v. United States,
347 U.S. 645 (1954); United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949). And there has
been a great deal of lower court litigation involving independent agencies.
See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 692, 699, 703
(1987) (dispute involving Tennessee Valley Authority and Department of
Energy); Dean v. Herrington, 668 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (same); see
also Herz, supra note 70, at 938-54 (describing examples of such litigation).
274. For examples of lower court litigation, see cases cited supra note 273.
The Supreme Court has also on occasion considered litigation involving
independent agencies. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153 (1953); United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426
(1949).
275. Of course, Nixon is different from litigation involving purely executive
agencies (say, between the Attorney General and the Secretary of Treasury,
or the Attorney General and the President himself), in that formal
independence from the President had been created by regulation.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
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authority to investigate and prosecute certain potential federal
crimes.277 The D.C. Circuit decided a case concluding that
Starr in fact had jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute
Webster Hubbell (and his wife, accountant and lawyer) for tax
offenses, over the objections to such jurisdiction offered by the
Attorney General by way of amicus curiae participation. 278
Such litigation between the Attorney General and other
prosecutorial components of the United States (say a United
States Attorney or a Division of the Justice Department) has
never occurred; the Attorney General, who is charged by
statute with representing the prosecutorial interests of the
United States, simply resolves the matter. But the
obviousness of that point is part of my argument-the
impossibility of litigation over these matters in the normal case
indicates how deeply the Ethics in Government Act strikes into
the Article 11 structure.279
B. THE ETHICS iN GOVERNMENT ACT'S DIMISHMENT OF
ARTICLE II ACCOUNTABILITY
There has been a great deal of commentary regarding the
harm that the Ethics in Government Act does to the interests
of the executive, perhaps none more devastating than Justice
Scalia's dissent in Morrison.280 In this part, rather than
rehearsing those points, I want to offer another, and quite
different, criticism of the Act's effect on the executive.
The purpose of a unitary executive was not solely to
provide efficiency and energy in the execution of the laws and
to provide a counterweight to the legislature, although those
surely were factors. 281 The purpose of Article H was also to
277. See In re Espy, 145 F.3d 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Espy, 80 F.3d 501
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
278. See United States v. Hubbell, 162 F.3d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
279. Some have argued that the practical necessity of an independent
counsel makes it justifiable for the courts to decide these matters in the place
of the Attorney General. In fact, that is the position of the Department of
Justice. See Brief Amicus Curiae For the United States Acting Through the
Attorney General at 15, In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Nos.
98-3060, 98-3062, 98-3072); see also Philip B. Kurland, United States v. Nixon:
Who Killed Cock Robin?, 22 UCLA L. REV. 68, 72 (1974) (arguing that when
there is a "break in the chain of command" in the executive branch, courts can
intervene and decide the matter).
280. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 67-72 (Alexander Hamilton); CHARLES
THAcH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789 (1923); see also DAVID
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ensure accountability for the execution of the laws.2 82
Hamilton emphasized the importance of accountability, and
the usefulness of a single executive in seeking to ensure that
the people were able to hold leaders accountable both for their
actions and their inaction.2 83
The complexities of political accountability, and the effects
on accountability of government arrangements such as the
creation of independent agencies, are beyond the scope of this
Article.284 My focus here is much more limited: given that
ensuring effective means of accountability is a constitutional
value in general, 285 and an Article II value in particular, how
does the operation of the Ethics in Government Act serve that
interest? Recent events, I suggest, provide strong support for
the conclusion that the Act greatly enhances the President's
incentives and means to avoid accountability for the execution
of the laws.
A President who is inclined to exploit the independence of
the independent counsel-for whatever reason-has ample
means at his or her disposal. The Act permits the President to
attack an independent counsel's investigation as abusive and
even illegal while plausibly claiming lack of any power to do
anything about it. As Professor O'Sullivan put it, "[t]he
administration and its allies obviously have every incentive in
appearing cooperative while attacking as biased or
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993); Prakash, supra note 179; Strauss,
supra note 112, at 596-602. But see Abner S. Greene, Discounting
Accountability, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1489, 1498-1504 (1997).
282. Thus even those who deny the theory that the Constitution
established a unitary executive in the sense that the President has to have
complete control over the execution of the laws agree that preserving the
value of accountability is essential to Article 11. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra
note 114, at 94; see also Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty and the
Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998).
283. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Steven G.
Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L.
REV. 23, 42-45 (1995).
284. There is, of course, a vast literature on this subject. For an
interesting discussion and a helpful collection of sources, see Brown, supra
note 282; see also Greene, supra note 281; Peter M. Shane, Political
Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential
Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161 (1995); Peter M. Shane,
Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors: Legal Accountability and the
Separation of Powers, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 361 (1993).
285. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see also Printz v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
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incompetent" an independent counsel whose investigation is
posing difficulties for the President.286
This danger has been made reality in the investigation of
Kenneth W. Starr. At the time he was appointed independent
counsel for Whitewater matters, the New York Times initially
responded to the appointment by characterizing it as "safe and
nonpartisan," and by praising Starr's past public service and
accomplishments. 28 7 Democrats quickly became critical of the
appointment, however, due to Starr's past associations and the
circumstances under which he was appointed to replace Robert
Fiske, the prosecutor whom Attorney General Reno had earlier
appointed pursuant to Justice Department regulations.288 And
while the White House publicly pledged to cooperate with the
new independent counsel, aides privately expressed
"bitterness" at the turn of events.289
As time and Starr's investigation wore on, the President
and his staff took to criticizing openly the fairness of the
investigation. Matters became acute when, in a pre-election
television interview in 1996, the President claimed that it was
"obvious" that Starr was "out to get him."290 And they became
286. O'Sullivan, supra note 7, at 474.
287. Editorial, An Even More Independent Counsel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1994, at A18. After the circumstances surrounding his appointment
(specifically the infamous lunch between Senator Lauch Faircloth and Judge
David B. Sentelle, at which, it is worth noting, both have denied discussing
the Whitewater independent counsel's appointment) became known, the
Times changed its view and called on Starr to resign so as to preserve the
appearance of fairness and impartiality. See Editorial, Mr. Starr's Duty to
Resign, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1994, at A22.
288. See David Johnston, Appointment in Whitewater Turns into a
Partisan Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1994, at Al; Stephen Labaton,
Democrats Build Pressure on New Prosecutor to Quit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
1994, at A14; see also PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE'S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 182-85 (9th ed. 1995) (describing events surrounding
replacement of Robert Fiske by Starr); Peter Applebome, Judge in Whitewater
Dispute Rewards Faith of His Patron, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1994, at Al.
289. Stephen Labaton, New Counsel Is Being Urged Not to Start Inquiry
Anew, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1994, at A8.
290. The News Hour with Jim Lehrer: Newsmaker; President Clinton;
Negative Politics and Whitewater (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 23, 1996);
Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Implies He Is Subject of a Vendetta, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 1996, at A18; see also Neil A. Lewis, Utah Senator Scolds Critics of
Prosecutor in Whitewater, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1996, at A12 (recounting
public criticisms of Starr by President Clinton's staff). Both the New York
Times and Washington Post criticized the President's comments. See
Editorial, 'Isn't It Obvious?', WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1996, at A24; Editorial,
Whitewater Sparring, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1996, at A26.
[Vol. 83:11971264
UNITED STATES V. NXON
extreme when Starr obtained jurisdiction over the Lewinsky
matter in January 1998; relations between the independent
counsel and the White House only deteriorated over the year
and a half of investigation accompanied by constant publicity
that followed.
In short, the President and his supporters came to be in
open "war," or in the words of the First Lady, in "battle"
against Starr and the "right wing" conspirators who were
seeking to destroy the President solely for political gain.291 For
his part, it appeared to many that Starr too had adopted a
battle mentality. Certainly the mainstream media concluded
as much.29
2
For the President's objections to Starr's investigation to
have credibility, he had to maintain an inability to control the
prosecutor; after all, if the prosecutor were subject to his or the
Attorney General's direction, then it would be strange for the
President to complain about conduct that is within his power to
control. Conveniently for the President, "the whole object" of
the Ethics in Government Act is to prevent the President from
controlling the course of an independent counsel
investigation.293 The Act thus provides the mechanism for the
President and his supporters to criticize the independent
counsel while claiming an inability to do anything about it.294
291. Today Show: Interview by Matt Lauer with Hillary Rodham Clinton,
(NBC television broadcast, Jan. 27, 1998).
292. Early in the Lewinsky investigation a photograph of Starr appeared
on the cover of Time Magazine, bearing the caption "Starr at War." See TIME,
Feb. 9, 1998.
293. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
294. Of course, if the Attorney General believed that Starr's investigation
was based on political bias, or had taken seriously illegal turns, there would
be a strong argument that she is obliged to dismiss him for cause. Certainly I
hope that an Assistant United States Attorney would be fired if he or she
actually engaged in abuses of power of even a fraction of the sort that the
President and his supporters claim Starr has. Moreover, there is a strong
argument that the President-if he truly believes what he and his supporters
have been saying about Starr since January 1998-has a duty to order the
Attorney General to dismiss Starr for cause. It is hard to see how the
President is taking care that the laws be faithfully executed when he permits
what he and his supporters believe is a rogue prosecutor to roam unchecked.
The conventional wisdom explaining why the President has not seen to
the discharge of Starr attributes the President's lack of action to political
reality-the ghosts of the Saturday Night Massacre have made it simply
unacceptable politically for the President to have an independent counsel
discharged. Thus, at an April ne'ws conference, when asked why he didn't
have Starr fired if he believed that Starr had acted abusively and illegally, the
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As events over the course of the Lewinsky investigation
confirm, such a presidential strategy can be extraordinarily
successful. Months passed with no substantive comment from
the President coupled with a steady stream of criticism of the
investigation as a political vendetta seeking to create facts that
did not exist. Steadily the independent counsel became more
unpopular, a fact that the President's supporters further
exploited as demonstrating the illegitimacy of the
investigation. 295  And the independent counsel, like all
prosecutors, was impeded by tradition and law296 from publicly
defending himself and his investigation in any significant
way.297
The upshot of all this is, paradoxically, that the Act's grant
of independence to the independent coLmsel left him at the
President's mercy once his administration made the decision to
attack the legitimacy of the investigation. As President Nixon
painfully learned, however, the situation would likely have
been far different if the Act did not exist. An investigation of
the President that is in control of the Attorney General has the
potential-so long as the political system maintains its
vigilance298-to be more effective. If the President had the
President responded that it would not be "appropriate" for him to do so.
President Clinton, Press Conference (Apr. 30, 1998).
As a colleague of Starr and his staff, I should note my bias on these
points.
295. See Damian Whitworth & Martin Fletcher, Report Dims Prosecutor's
Star, THE TIMES, Sept. 23, 1998, Overseas News Section ("Throughout recent
months, Mr Starr's approval ratings have been as low as 18 per cent and
peaked at 32 per cent."); Paul H.B. Shin, Starr Brighter, but Case Isn't, 2 Polls
Report, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Nov. 21, 1998, at 7 ("A CBS News poll
released yesterday showed an 8-point jump to 26% from 18% in Stair's
approval rating after his 11 12-hour televised testimony.").
296. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
297. As the impeachment proceedings against the President advanced,
Starr did have an opportunity to defend himself and the course of his
investigation during his day-long appearance testifying before the House
Judiciary Committee. By then, of course, the damage had been done-so
much so that the media referred to Starr's appearance as his last chance to
salvage any public reputation from the ruins of the Lewinsky investigation
and the four years that preceded it. See, e.g., Carl M. Cannon & Kirk Victor,
Starr's Last Chance, THE NATIONAL JOURNAL, Nov. 21, 1998 at 2762.
298. The Act also works to reduce the accountability of Congress. Rather
than exercising its legitimate oversight role when there are potential conflicts
of interest in federal criminal investigations, the Act permits Congress to sit
back and let an independent counsel do its work Contrast, for example, the
strong congressional interest in the recent campaign finance investigation run
by the Justice Department with the congressional willingness to stand by and
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unquestioned power to fire the prosecutor investigating him,
then he simply could not get away with attacking the
investigation's legitimacy. Consider how different the
Lewinsky situation would have been had the Attorney General
been responsible for the investigation. As has been much
noted,299 one lesson of Watergate is that the system can hold
the President accountable. And the Ethics in Government Act,
by allowing the President plausibly to claim martyrdom,
undermines that laudable goal.
IV. CONCLUSION
The investigation of possible crimes by the President or
those close to him presents extraordinary challenges to the rule
of law. The last generation's response to those challenges has
been the institution of the independent counsel, which was
created in the wake of Watergate and the perceived dangers of
allowing the investigation and prosecution of such crimes to
remain subject-even if only formally-to the direction and
control of the Attorney General. Apart from general questions
regarding the constitutionality and advisability of the
independent counsel system, my subject has been the
constitutional oddities raised by litigation occurring within
that system.
During Watergate, the system was content to rely on a
mechanism that gave a special prosecutor regulatory
independence from the President and Attorney General. And
that mechanism successfully brought to justice lawbreakers at
the highest levels of the executive branch-including a former
attorney general, and in a manner of speaking the President of
the United States himself. The exigencies of the situation,
however, led the Nixon Court astray in holding that the special
prosecutor's regulatory independence-which was entirely
voluntary and subject to repeal at the whim of the Attorney
do nothing to investigate the Lewinsky matter so long as the independent
counsel investigation was proceeding.
The Act also goes so far as to require the independent counsel to report to
the House of Representatives if the prosecutor concludes that he or she has
substantial and credible information that might constitute grounds for an
impeachment of the President. 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994). For a powerful
critique of this provision, see Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Interaction Between
Impeachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193 (1998).
299. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 487 U.S.
652 (1988); Calabresi, supra note 283, at 90-94. But see HARRIGER, supra note
82, at 40-72.
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General-created Article III adversity between him and the
President.
The post-Watergate passage of the Ethics in Government
Act was sufficient to solve the Article HI problem posed by the
regulatory special prosecutor. But by creating legal adversity
between the independent counsel and the President, as well as
the rest of the executive branch, the Act intruded deeply into
the functioning of the Article II branch. The constitutional
dilemma of the independent counsel system is unavoidable-
with the statutory action necessary to create Article III
adversity comes prosecutorial independence to disrupt the
functioning of the Article II branch.
